Ralph Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc. F & R Roe, Inc., and Stanley E. Wheeler : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Ralph Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc. F & R Roe,
Inc., and Stanley E. Wheeler : Petition for Writ of
Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert J. DeBry; Robert J. DeBry & Associates; Attorneys for Petitioner.
M. Dayle Jeffs; Jeffs and Jeffs; Attorneys for Respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, No. 910404.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3655
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
'.59 
DOCKET NO. 
UTAH SUPRr;M~ ~Qy~"t 
aRIE~ 
LiloL/04 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: 0./ D ~ o' l 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------)----------------------------
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
M. DP.YLE JEFFS 
JEFFS (, JEFFS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake city, UT 84107 
F I LED 
Sf? 3 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------)--------------------------
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
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Pursuant to Rules 46 and 49 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Ralph Ostler petitions the Utah Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari to review that portion of the unpublished 
Court of Appeals' opinion entered on August 5, 1991, where in the 
Court of Appeals ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate. 
1 Ostler has a lso filed a Petition for writ of Mandamus. The 
issues in both petitions overlap. 
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III. 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The parties to this proceeding are petitioner Ralph 
Ostler, and respondents, Albina Transfer Co., Inc., F & R Roe, 
Inc., Stanley Wheeler. 
IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does an appellate court have jurisdiction to consider an 
uncontested Motion to Recall the Mandate, particularly when the 
motion is filed in response to a petition for sanctions? 
V. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The official unpublished opinion is attached in the 
Appendix. 
VI. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The date of the decision sought to be reviewed is August 
5, 1991. The statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on the 
Utah Supreme Court to review the decision are: 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, §§ 3 and 4. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2, (3) (a) and (5). 
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VII. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory provisions are U.R.A.P. 46, 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3, Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-4. Copies 
attached in the Appendix . 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This litigation arose out of a collision between a pickup 
driven by Ostler's father and a truck parked in the highway 
emergency lane. Ostler was a passenger in the pickup. Ostler's 
father was the driver. Respondent Wheeler was the driver of the 
truck. Wheeler's employers are respondents Albina Transfer Co., 
Inc. and F & R Roe, Inc. 
As a result of the collision, Ostler's father was killed 
and Ostler suffered permanent and paralyzing injuries. Ostler does 
not walk. He is painfully confined to a wheel chair. 
At trial, the judge ruled that Wheeler negligently parked 
the truck in the emergency lane and directed a verdict against the 
respondents on the issue of negligence. However, Ostler lost at 
trial. The jury ruled that the truck driver's negligent conduct 
was not the proximate cause of Ostler's injuries. 
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. 
(Appendix 1). Subsequently, Ostler filed a petition for rehearing 
2 
with the Court of Appeals (Appendix 2) and thereafter a petition 
for certiorari with this Court. (Appendix 3). In support of the 
petitions, Ostler filed the Affidavit of Patricia Hanna, 
chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the University of 
Utah ("Hanna affidavit") (Appendix 4) . 
After both petitions were denied, respondents filed a 
Motion for sanctions with the Utah Court of Appeals . The motion 
alleged that the petition for rehearing, the petition for 
certiorari and the Hanna affidavit were all filed in bad faith and 
contrary to U.R.C.P. 11. (Appendix 5). 
Ostler filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for 
Sanctions. (Appendix 6). Ostler's memorandum was supported by 
affidavits from the former Dean of the University of Utah College 
of Law (Thurman), the former Dean of the Brigham Young University 
College of Law (Hawkins), and a nationally known professor of 
Evidence (Goldsmith). (See Appendices 7, 8, 9). 
However, Ostler did more than simply defend against the 
Motions for Sanctions. Based upon the same aff idavi ts, Ostler 
affirmatively filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate. (Appendix 10) . 
Faced with the affidavits of Thurman, Hawkins and 
Goldsmith, the respondents elected not to file any memorandum in 
opposition to Ostler's Motion to Recall the Mandate. 
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In a three page unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals 
denied the respondents' Motion for Sanctions. The Court of Appeals 
also denied the Motion to Recall the Mandate. (Appendix 11). Only 
one sentence was devoted to Ostler's Motion To Recall the Mandate: 
writ 
(FJor lack of jurisdiction . 
motions to recall mandate and 
the response to the petition. 
we deny the 
to supplement 
Ostler ,timely petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a 
Of .£~I':tJ ~ ,~I 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
The statutory considerations for granting certiorari are 
as follows: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in 
the way that is in conflict with a decision of 
the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a 
departure by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the supreme Court's power of 
supervision; or 
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(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
important question of municipal, 
federal law which has not been, but 
settled by the supreme Court. 
decided an 
state, or 
should be, 
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
B. The Court of Appeals' Rul i ng is in Conflict with Prior 
Decisions of this Court. 
without analysis or citation of authority , the Utah Court 
of Appeals, in a one sentence opinion, ruled that appellate courts 
do not have jurisdiction to recall a mandate. The decision is 
contrary to the actions of this Court in Fenton v . Salt Lake Co., 
4 Utah 116 (1885). In Fenton, the Utah Supreme Court effectively 
granted a motion to recall the mandate (without using the name). 
The ruling is also contrary to Miller v. Southern Pacific 
Co . , 24 P.2d 380 (Utah 1933). In Miller, the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that an appellate court can recall a remitter if it "was 
issued . improperly, or to correct an irregularity or error in 
the issuance of the remitter. " 
C. The Court of Appe a ls' Ruling Conflicts with Another Decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
In Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 
1988), the Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court has 
jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief from a judgment even 
after a notice of appeal is filed . The Baker decision is pre-
dicated on the concept that the court has jurisdiction to review, 
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correct or amend its judgment or order after the case has been 
placed with another court. See generally, Greater Boston Tele-
vision Corp. v. F.C.C., 463, F.2d 268, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
The Baker court held that a court does. The Court of Appeals, in 
this case, held that it does not. certiorari should be granted to 
resolve the conflict. 
D. Whether Appellate Courts have Jurisdiction to Recall a Mandate 
is an Important Ouestion of State Law Which Should be Settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court is charged with determining the 
extent of its own appellate jurisdiction and the appellate juris-
diction of the Utah Court of Appeals. It is also charged with 
constructing the rules of appellate procedure. (Utah Const. Art. 
VIII, § 3: Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-4). This case presents the court 
with the opportunity to clarify the law regarding motions to recall 
the mandate. 
Appellate courts have inherent power or jurisdiction to 
recall and review their own judgments, mandates, and orders. This 
is so even if the motion was filed after the time allowed for a 
petition for rehearing, or even if a petition for rehearing was 
denied. See Cahill v. N.Y., N,H, & Hartford R.R . Co., 351 U.S. 183 
(1956); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Thevenet, 686 P.2d 954 
(N.M. 1984); Marshall v. Amos, 442 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1968); Reimers 
v. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co., 273 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1954); Lindus v. 
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Northern Insurance Co. of N.Y., 438 P.2d 311 (Ariz. 1968); Chapman 
v. st. Stephen's Protestant Episcopal Church, 138 So. 630 (Fla. 
1932); Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. / 382 U.S. 25 
(1965) . 
As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in 
Coleman v. Turpin, 827 F.2d 667 (loth Cir. 1987): 
[A]n appellate court has power to set aside at 
any time a mandate to prevent an 
injustice or to preserve the integrity of the 
judicial process. 
Id. at 671. 
The appellate court's power or jurisdiction to recall its 
mandate and reconsider its decision exists regardless of whether 
there is a rule or statute specifically authorizing the court to do 
so. ~, Yonadi v. Homestead county Homes, 127 A.2d 198 (N.J. 
1956); see Boudar v. EG&G Inc., 742 P.2d 491 (N.M. 1987). The 
basis for this rule is that: 
[T]he interest in finality of litigation must 
yield where the interests of justice would 
make unfair the strict application of 
rules. 
united States v. Ohio Power Co./ 353 U.S. 98, 100 (1957). 
An appellate court's inherent jurisdiction or power to 
recall the mandate springs from English equity common law juris-
prudence. The United States Supreme Court, in holding that a 
Circuit Court of Appeals had the jurisdiction, power, and duty to 
recall its mandate and vacate its earlier judgment explained: 
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From the beginning there has existed. . a 
rule of equity to the effect that under 
certain circumstances relief will be 
granted against judgments regardless of the 
terms of their entry. Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 
U.S. 589. This equity rule, which was firmly 
established in English practice long before 
the foundation of our Republic . . . developed 
and fashioned to fulfill a universally 
recognized need for correcting injustices 
which, in certain instances, are deemed 
sufficiently gross to demand a departure from 
rigid adherence to term rules. 
* * * 
It is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to 
relieve hardships which, from time to time, 
ar~se from a hard and fast adherence to 
another court-made rule, the general rule that 
judgments should not be disturbed after the 
term of their entry has expired. Created to 
avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this 
equitable procedure has always been character-
ized by flexibility which enables it to meet 
new situations which demand equitable inter-
vention, and to accord all the relief neces-
sary to correct particular injustices . 
* * * 
We think that when this court, a century ago, 
approved this practice and held that federal 
appellate courts have the power to pass upon, 
and hence to grant or deny, petitions for 
bills of review even though the petitions be 
presented long after the term of the 
challenged judgment has expired, it settled 
the procedural question here involved. 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 
248-49 (1944). 
By statute, Utah adopted the Common Law of England: 
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The Common Law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the 
constitution or laws of the united states, or 
the constitution or laws of this state, and so 
far only as it is consistent with and adopted 
to the natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessity of the people hereof, 
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 
(Emphasis added). 
Ut a h Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1953 as amended) . 
In this case, the Court of Appeals, in one sentence, 
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider Ostler's Motion to 
Recall the Mandate. That ruling implies that its prior defective 
decision must stand. However: 
[Appellate decisions 1 must be final because 
they are right, and not right because they are 
final, even if we must take the untoward 
action of acknowledging our incorrect limita-
tion of the issues presented to us on previous 
rehearing. 
Boudar, supra at 443. 
Applying statutory principles similar to the common law 
principles described above, the Utah Supreme Court in an 1885 
decision effectively granted a motion to recall the mandate 
(although without using the name). Fenton v . Salt Lake Co., 4 Utah 
116 (1885). 
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that a 
trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion for relief from 
a judgment even after a notice of appeal is filed. Baker v . 
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Western Surety Co., 757 P . 2d 878 (Utah App. 1988) . The Baker 
decision is based on the idea that a trial court has jurisdiction 
to review, correct and amend its own judgments. see generally, 
Baker at 880-81i Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F . C. C., 463 
F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971). However, the Court of Appeals failed to 
recognize that it has the same inherent power to review its own 
decisions that the trial court had in Baker, supra. 
E. The opinions of the Court of Appeals Departs From the Accepted 
Course of Judicial Proceedings . 
The affidavits of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith 
(Appendices 7, 8, 9) show that there has been a grave miscarriage 
of justice in this case. According to Dean Samuel Thurman: "In 
Ostler proximate cause should have been directed by the trial 
court." (Appendix 7 at p. 4). According to Dean Hawkins: "The 
opin i on of the Court of Appeals obscures the basic legal question 
as to the scope of liability. " (Appendix 8 at para. 3). 
Also, Dean Hawkins states: "Thus, by this line of analysis, the 
trial court should have directed a verdict for plaintiff on the 
issue of causation as well as on the issue of defendant's 
negligence." (Appendix 8 at para. 7). According to Professor 
Goldsmith : " . .. The published opinion committed serious error in 
at least two critical respects. " (Appendix 9 at para. 15). 
Professor Goldsmith's affidavit also directs the court's attention 
to the following comments of Justice Jackson: 
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But if I haver agreed to any prior decision 
which forecloses what now seems to be a 
sensible construction of this Act, I must 
frankly admit that I was unaware of it. 
Under these circumstances, except for any 
personal humiliation involved in admitting 
that I do not always understand the opinions 
of this Court, I see no reason why I should be 
consciously wrong today because I was 
unconsciously wrong yesterday. 
Massachusetts v . united states, 333 U. S. 611, 639-40 (1948) 
(Jackson, J.). 
On another occasion, Justice Jackson stated: 
Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by 
which a judge may recede from a prior opinion 
that has proven untenable. . . . But an escape 
less self-depreciating was taken by Lord 
Westbury, who, it is said rebuffed a barris-
ter's reliance upon an earlier opinion of his 
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed 
that a man of my intelligence should have been 
guilty of giving such an opinion." If there 
are other ways of gracefully and good natured-
ly surrendering former views to a better 
considered position, I invoke them all. 
McGrath v . Kristensen, 340 U.S . 162, 177-78 (1950) (Jackson, J.). 
However, a threshold issue may be whether such affidavits 
are appropriate. It is important to note that the expert 
aff idav i ts came into this case as a defensive measure. After 
Wheeler won his case in the trial court and the appellate courts, 
he petitioned the Court of Appeals for sanctions. Specifically, 
Wheeler urged that Ostler's petition for certiorari and the Hanna 
affidavit were frivolous and in bad faith. 
The only way Ostler could show that the petition and 
affidavit were not frivolous was by obtaining affidavits from 
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experts in torts (Hawkins); evidence (Goldsmith) and legal ethics 
(Thurman). Thus, Wheeler's motion for sanctions triggered the need 
for the expert affidavits. 
The expert affidavits show that the motion for sanctions 
is without merit; however, at the same time, those same affidavits 
describe the egregious errors of the trial court and Court of 
Appeals. Or stated in other words, Ostler offered the affidavits 
of Thurman, Hawkins and Goldsmith as a defensive measure; however, 
those same affidavits necessarily show that the mandate should be 
recalled. ~_ --h \ 
c:et"1/01'tt1'"1 
Therefore, granting ,u .. ""laJDl:I:g' will not open the floodgates 
for the use of such expert affidavits in other appellate pro-
ceedings. This case can only be cited to approve expert affidavits 
(commenting on a court's opinion) which are offered defensively. 
x. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for certiorari should be granted . 
DATED this .=3- day of _~~""Jf-"--' -' ___ , 1991. 
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
r Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 1 
Cite ... :-71=> 1 f.2d ~5 (Uah App . 1989) 
tion , claiming that the Jangu:l...Z.e is confu::-
, 
ing and incomplete. Plaint sought to 
further define and expand the gi\'en in · 
struction. While it is true, as plaintiff ar· 
gues, that jury instructions should be 
"clear in meaning and concise as possible in 
lay people's language without belaboring 
definitions," Johnson v. CO)'1l1mll Ware· 
house Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25 
(1965), the adoption of plaintiff's sugges-
tions would have run counter to this rule. 
Although we cannot asce rtain from the 
record the rationale behind the trial court's 
o\'erruling of plaintiff's objections, any ex· 
pansion of the given instruction would ha\'e 
likely hindered, ra ther than enhanced, the 
jury's comprehens ion of the issue. 
The challenged instruction must also be 
considered in the context of the instruc' 
tions as a whole. Madsen v. BToUln, 701 
P.2d 1086, 1092 (Utah 1985); S/.ate v. 
Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah 1981). 
Other instructions propose plaintiff's thea· 
ry of the case, i.e., " concurrent negli-
gence," and add meaning to the instruction 
at issue. Although plaintiff contends that 
the jury believed that causation meant 
"fault," he fails to support this supposition. 
We cannot delve into the jury's reasoning 
process, and cannot speculate what 
"cause" the jury assigned to the accident. 
However, it is just as reasonable to pre-
sume, as in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 
455, 458 (Utah 1981), that the jury deter-
mined that the degree of Stephen Ostler's 
inattentiveness was not foreseeable . Thus, 
"he failed to observe the s ituation he 
should ha\'e ... [and] this later negligent 
act became the sole proximate cause of the 
collision." Id. Since plaintiff has failed to 
show that any alleged confusion was sub-
stantial an d prejudicial, we reject plaintiff's 
claim of error. 
DIRECTED VERDICT ON CAUSATION 
We last address plaintiffs argument that 
the trial court erred in not directing a ver-
dict of proximate cause as a matter of law. 
Our re\'iew of a challenge to the denial of a 
motion for a directed verdict is governed by 
the standard described in Penrod l '. Car-
ter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987): 
A mOLion for a directcli..xe rdict requires 
the tri al court to consi . the evidence in 
the light ' most favorable to the party 
against whom it is directed. The case 
should not be taken from the jury where 
there is substantial dispute in the evi-
dence. . .. On appeal, this Court applies 
the same rules. 
(Citation omitted.) See also Cook Assors., 
Inc. 1.'. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 
19831. 
The trial court resen'ed the issue of 
"proximate cause" after directing a verdict 
that Wheeler was negligent. "Proximate 
cause" is one of the essential elements of a 
negligence action, see William.s t·. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985), and is specif-
ically "that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, (unbroken by an effi-
cient intervening cause), produces the inju-
ry and without which the result would not 
have occurred." Mitchell v. PeaTson En -
teTS., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). Proxi-
mate causation is generally a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury. Wat-
ters, 626 P.2d at 457- 58. 
[lO] The trial court denied plaintiff's 
motions for a directed verdict on the issue 
of causation. Under the applicable stan-
dard of review, we are required to view the 
e\'idence in defendants' favor. That evi-
dence, tending to establish that proximate 
cause was not only in substantial dispute, 
but was the very essence of the contronr-
sy between the parties, indicates that the 
trial court properly declined to remove the 
issue from the jury. We find no error in 
the ruling below. 
In conclusion, none of plaintiff's claims 
constitute reversible error. We have re-
viewed other issues raised by plaintiff and 
find th em to be without merit. The judg-
ment is affirmed. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSOK, JJ., 
concur. 
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It is unnecessary to resoh'e this argu · 
ment wh en the alternate basis for the 
court's r uling is considered, namely, that 
the question of how long Wheeler had been 
parked ultil1latel,' went to the issue of 
Wheeler's negligence. Since that issue had 
been resolved by directed verdict, the ex· 
cluded t.estimony was irrele\'ant. Similar· 
Iy, plaintiff claims that he was not permit· 
ted to impeach Wheeler with Wheeler's 
"prior bad acts," specifically, Wheeler's vi· 
olation of federal motor carrier regulations. 
These acts also concerned the issue of 
\I'heeler's negligence and were properly ex· 
eluded. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
(7) Plaintiff complains of statements 
made by defense counsel during closing 
argument. Defense counsel made the fol· 
lowing remark: 
This case is to decide whether Wheeler, 
... F & R Roe and Albina are to pay for 
the injuries to Ralph, when Wheeler's 
actions were not the cause of the acci· 
dent. 
Plaintiff timely reserved an objection out 
of the presence of the jury. He now ar· 
gues that the statement was improper, 
prejudicial, and untrue for the reason that 
"any recovery would come from the insur· 
ance carrier," and that the remark unfairly 
implies that defendants would personally 
pay any damage award. 
We are not convinced that there is an)' 
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it 
reDects the fact that judgment would be 
rendered against the various defendants 
under joint and se\'eral liability, and does 
not indicate the source of funds to pay such 
a judgment. It does not inappropriately 
state that insurance would or would not 
pay any judgment, see l'tah R.E\·id. 4!l, 
thus improperly eliciting sympathy or tem· 
pering the size of any award. Cf Priel ". 
R.E.D., inc., 392 N. \\·.2d 65 (l\.D.1986) 
("We are talking about money that my 
client will ha\'e to pa y out of his Ole?/. 
pocket." (emphasis added)). We conclude 
that the remark was not unfairly preju· 
dicial. 
[8) P laintiff also objected to the follow· 
ing portion of defendants' closing argu· 
ment: 
[T)he foreseeability question is: How 
was Stan Wheeler expected t.o foresee 
that at that precise time if, as Me. DeBry 
said, one in a billion chances that it 
would happen right at that particular 
time-
Plaintiff argues that this was a misstate· 
ment of the law because "foreseeability 
relates to whether accidents of this general 
nature might happen." He further asserts 
that the statemellt was prejudicial and that 
"[t)he only explanation for [the) verdict is 
that the jury was confused by [defense 
counsel's) misstatements of the law." 
We disagree. El'en if counsel's remarks 
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact 
appears to be negated by the court's ad· 
monishment: 
The Jury is directed to look at the In-
structions. They set forth the law in 
that regard. Statement of counsel is to 
be disregarded except as it is accurate. 
See Hall t'. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error 
shown where court admonished jury follow· 
ing remarks during closing argument). 
When considered in the context of the en· 
tire closing argument, plaintiff's objection, 
and the court's admonition, we conclude 
there was no unfair prejudice . See gener· 
ally Halford 1'. Yandell, 558 S.\\, .2d 400, 
41H2 (Mo.Ct.App.1977). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiff further assigns as error two 
jury instructions. The first instruction in· 
\'oh'ed the placement of emergency warn · 
ing devices behind Wheeler's parked truck. 
\Ve agree that the gi\'en instruction signifi· 
cantl)' differed f"0111 plaintiff's requested 
instruction. Howe\'er, the instru ction can· 
cerned the issue of Wheeler's negligence. 
We have already est3blished that this issue 
had been taken from the jury. Any error 
could not hal'e affected the substantial 
rights of plaintiff, and was, therefore, 
harmless. 
[9) Plaintiff also objects to the trial 
court's instruction on the issue of cause.· 
( 
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It is unnecessary to resolve this argu-
ment when the alternate basis for the 
court's ruling is considered, namely, that 
the question of how long Wheeler had been 
parked ultimately went to the issue of 
Wheeler's negligence. Since that issue had 
been resolved by directed verdict, the ex-
cluded testimony was irrel e'-ant. Similar-
ly, plaintiff claims that he was not permit-
ted to impeach Wheeler with Wheeler's 
"prior bad acts ," specifically , Wheeler's ,- i-
alation of federal motor carrier regulations. 
These acts also concerned the issue of 
Wheeler's negligence and were properly ex-
cl uded. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
[7] Plaintiff complains of statements 
made by defense counsel during closing 
argument. Defen,e counsel made the fol-
lowing remark: 
This case is to decide whether Wheeler, 
.. _ F & R Roe and Albina are to pay for 
the injuries to Ra lph, when Wheeler 's 
actions were not the cause of the acci-
dent. 
Plaintiff timely resen-ed an objection out 
of the presence of the jury. He now ar-
gues that the Sl<1temtnt was improper, 
prejudicial, and untrue for the reason that 
"any recovery would come from the insur-
ance car rier," and that the remark unfairly 
implies that defendants would personally 
pay any damage award. 
We are not convinced that there is any 
impropriety in this remark. Simply put, it 
reflects the fact tha t judgment would be 
rendered against the various defendants 
under joint and several liability, and does 
not indicate th e source of funds to pay such 
a judgment. It does not in appropriatel y 
state that insurance would or would not 
pay any judgment, see Ctah R.E,-id. 411, 
thus improperly eliciting sym pathy or tem-
pering the size of any award. Cj P,-iel 1'. 
R.E.D_, inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D .laS6) 
("We are l<1lking about money that my 
client will have to payout of his OIL'n 
pocket." (emphasis added)). We conclude 
that the remark was not unfairly preju-
dicial. 
[8 ] Plaintiff al so objected to the follow-
ing portion of defendants' closing argu-
ment: 
[T]he foreseeability question is: How 
was Stan Wheeler expected to foresee 
that at that precise time if, as Mr. DeBry 
said, one in a billion chances that it 
would happen ri ght at that particular 
time-
Plaintiff argues that this was a mis state-
ment of the law because "foreseeability 
relates to whethe r acc idents of th is general 
natu re might happen." He further asserts 
that the statement was prejudicial and that 
"[t]he only explanation for [the] ,- erdict is 
that the jury was confused by [defense 
counsel' s] misstatements of the law." 
We disagree . Even if counsel's remarks 
misstated the law, any prejudicial impact 
appears to be negated by the court 's ad-
monishment: 
The Jury is directed to look at the In-
structions. They set forth the law in 
that regard. Statement of counsel is to 
be disregarded except as it is accurate. 
See Hall v_ Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 
P.2d 664, 666 (1966) (no prejudicial error 
shown where court admonished jury follow-
ing remarks during closing argument). 
When considered in the context of the en-
tire closing argument, plaintiff's objection, 
and the court 's admonition, we conclude 
the re was no unfair prejudice. See gener-
ally Ha lford t'. Yandell, 55S S.W_2d 400, 
411-12 ( ~!0. CL-\pp.1977 ) . 
J UR Y INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiff fur ther assigns as error two 
jury instructions. The first instruction in-
volved the placement of emergency warn-
ing de,-ices behind Wheeler's parked truck. 
We agree that the given instruction sign ifi-
cantly differed from plaintiffs req uested 
instruction. However , the in struction con· 
ce rned the issue of Wh eele r 's negligence. 
We have already established that this issue 
had been taken from the jury. Any error 
could not have affected the substantial 
rights of plaintiff. and was, therefore, 
hal-mless. 
[9] Plaintiff also objects to the trial 
cou r t's ins truction on the issue of causa-
It appears, howner, that tf. ~onditions of 
the fi lm 's production were 1.' . from similar 
to the actual accident. The differences in 
lighting and driver alertness and skill were 
crucial. The literal controversy of this law-
suit is the inexplicable departure of a ve-
hicle from the lane of traffic. The video-
tape does not, and cannot, depict the condi-
tions that caused that departure. Any oth-
er depiction is, as the trial court concluded, 
not reconstruction, but speculation. In 
contrast to Whitehead, the circumstances 
of this accident are not known, and there is 
no indication that the design characteristics 
of vehicles were responsible. The discrep-
ancies between the film and plaintiff's acci-
dent seem to go beyond weight. Since the 
film would not "make the existence of any 
fact ... of consequence.. more probable 
than not" under Utah R.Evid. 401, we are 
not convinced plaintiff has satisfied the 
first two prongs of similarity and relevance 
under the Whitehead test. 
Even giving plaintiff the benefit of our 
doubt as to the film's relevance and similar-
ity, we conclude that, in any event, the trial 
court properly excluded the videotape as 
substantive evidence on the grounds of po-
tential confusion_ See Utah R.Evid. 403. 
Under Whitehead 's third prong, such evi-
dence may be excluded in the court's dis-
cretion even if it is re levant, when a deter-
mination is made that it may confuse or 
mislead. 101 Utah Adv.Rep. at 31 (trial 
court upheld although unclear whether 
court excluded evidence under rule 401 or 
403, either theory of excl usion being prop-
er). Since plaintiff has not demonstrated 
that the finding of potential confusion was 
an abuse of the court 's discretion, we hold 
that the videotape was properly excluded. 
[5] We last address plaintiff's claim of 
error regarding the exclusion of evidence 
on federal motor carrier regulations and 
road safety and design. Plaintiff argues 
that this evidence was relevant to the issue 
of foreseeability under his theory of con-
current negligence. Pla intiff quotes Code-
sky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 
545-46 (Utah 1984): 
The law does not nf ' -'Sarily recognize 
only one proximate \ .. _ ... se of an injury, 
consisting of only one factor, one act, or 
the conduct of only one person. To the 
contrary, the acts and omissions of two 
or more persons may work concurrently 
as the efficient cause of an injury, and in 
such a case, each of the participating 
acts or omissions is regard ed in law as a 
proximate cause and both may be held 
responsible. 
We have examined the reco rd and agree 
that some of this e\'idence rna)' be relevant 
to the issue of foreseeability. Other evi-
dence goes to the issue of Whee ler's negli-
gence, a matter previously decided by di-
rected verdict, and may be excluded as 
irrelevant. See Utah R.Ev id . 402 ("Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissi-
ble."). The coun excluded the relevant 
portions of the expert 's proffered testimo-
ny on the grounds that such evidence 
would not be particularly helpful to the 
jury. The court believed that the jury was 
as capable as the expert to make the deter-
mination of foreseeability. We agree, in any 
event, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden 
of showing that the claimed error was sub-
stantial and _prejudicial. See Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987); 
Utah R.Civ.P . 6l. In the absence of such a 
showing, we consider plaintiff's claim to be 
without merit. 
nrPEACHME:\T 
[6] Plaintiff argues that the court's re-
fusal to permit him to sho\\' that Wheeler 
may have been parked on the shoulder of 
the highway for as long as thirty minutes 
unduly restricted cross-examination. Al -
though plaintiff concedes that the trial 
judge has broad discretion in regulating 
the scope of such testimony , see, e.g., 
Whit ehead, 101 Utah Adv.Rep. at 28, he 
claims that the court abused its discretion by 
misapplying the law. Plaintiff claims that he 
was attempting to show consistency with 
prior deposition testimony, and the court 
rul ed that only prior inconsistent statements 
may be compared. 
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Even if such a theory is admissible under 
the threshold requirement of inherent relia-
bility, see Stale 1'. Rim masch, 775 P.2d 
388, 398-99 (Utah 1989), the theory is 
premised on the fact that a driver must be 
awake in order to be so "lured." Plain· 
tiff's o\\'n expert admitted that there \\'as 
no conclusive way to determine Stephen 
Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the 
accident. Nor does the theory necessarily 
establish causation because plaintiff's ex· 
pert conceded that none of the facto rs trig· 
gering the moth phenomenon were pro\·en. 
Without this foundation, the court deter· 
mined that the expert testimony on the 
moth phenomenon would not be helpful to 
the jury, and furthermore, that it would 
be prejudicial to present an opinion based 
on such pure conjecture. 
This is consistent with the principle that 
"any expert evidence, scientifically b,,:sed 
or otherwise" must, on balance, "be helpful 
to the trier of fact." Id. at 398 n. 8. Such 
evidence must be scrutinized carefully to 
avoid the "tendency of the finde r of fact to 
abandon its responsibility to decide the crit-
ical issues and simply adopt the judgment 
of the expert despite an inability to accu-
rately appraise the validity of the underly-
ing science." Id. at 396. Whether the 
probative value of e\'idence is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect is a 
det.e rmination within the sound discretion 
of the trial COUI·t. State v. Johnson, 115 
Utah Adv.Rep. at 9. Under rules 403 and 
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we con· 
clude that the trial judge was \\'ithin his 
discretion to exclude the testimony. 
[ ~) Similarly, the trial court concluded 
that plaintiff's videotaped demonstration 
was more apt to be confusing to the jury 
than helpful. The videotape depicted a 
compact pickup truck driving off the road-
way at the actual accident location. It 
purported to show that no mishap would 
have occurred had Wheeler's truck not 
been parked on the road shoulder . Plain-
tiff first argues that the videotape was for 
illustrative purposes and \\'as proper under 
.Hillers Nat 'f IllS. Co. ·v. Wichita Fiollr 
.If/lis Co., 25i F.2d 93 (10th Cir.1958) and 
other cases. It is ob\' ious, howeve r, that 
the film did not illustrate the accident, but 
rather portrayed plaintiff's prediction of 
Hents under a different set of facts. As 
such, the potential for unfair prejudice as 
illustrati\'e e\'idence was significant, and 
the trial court was within its discretion to 
exclude it. 
Plaintiff alternati\'ely argues that the 
videotape was admissible as e\'idence. 
Plaintiff cites DiRosario 1'. Harens, 196 
Cal..-\pp.3d 1~24, 242 Cal.Rptr. 423 (1987) 
for the proposition that experimental e\'i-
dence is admissible provided it is conducted 
under substantially similar conditions as 
that of the actual incident. "The standard 
that must be met in determining whether 
the proponent of the experiment has met 
the burden of proof oi establishing the 
preliminary fact essential to the admissibili-
ty of the experimental evidence is whether 
the conditions were substantially identical, 
not absolutely identical." Id. 242 Cal.Rptr. 
at 426 (quoting Culpepper v. Volkswagen 
of America, Inc., 33 Cal.App.3d 510, 521. 
109 Cal.Rptr. 110 (1973)). DiRosa,.io im· 
poses two other requirements- that the ex· 
perimental evidence be relevant and not 
consume undue time , confuse the issues, or 
mislead the jury. Id. 242 Cal.Rptr. at 426. 
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales 
Corp., 101 Utah Adv.Rep. 27 (1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the Clllpep-
per three·prong test in determining the ad-
missibility of motor vehicle crash test films. 
The court upheld the admission of the films 
into e\'idence and held that certain discrep-
ancies between the films and the actual acci-
dent went to weight, rathe r than adm issibil-
ity. The circumstances of the accident were 
known and the films were offered to show 
the handling characteristics of similar vehi· 
cles. 
In this case, application of the lVhitc-
head test supports exclusion of the evi-
dence. Pbintiff admits that the videotape 
differed from the actual accident in that 
the videotape was produced during day-
light conditions and employed an alert, pro-
fes sional stunt dri\'er. He further argues 
that e\'en with these discrepancies, the 
demonstration was substantially similar. 
verdict for defendants. Plointiff appeals 
from the \'erdict, alleging n .erous errors. 
VOIR DIRE 
[ I ) We first address plaintiff's claim 
that jury voir dire was inadequate to re \'eal 
bias related to a "tort refo rm" advertising 
campaign conducted by a national insur· 
ance company. It is obvious from the trial 
transcript that the gist of plaintiff's ques-
tions went to th e issue of potential juror 
bias against large monetary awards. 
Rule 47 (a) of the Utah Rule s of Civil 
Procedure requires the court to permit the 
parties to supplement voir dire with ques-
tions that are material and prope r. How-
ever , the court has considerable discretion 
to "contain voir dire within reasonable lim-
its." Hornsby v. Corporation of the Pre-
siding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932-33 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). Whether that discretion has 
been abused is determined from the totality 
of the questioning. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 
456, 457-58 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
In lieu of plaintiffs proposed questions, 
the judge informed the venire that plain-
tiff's claim may exceed a million dollars 
and asked if any would object to an award 
of thal magnitude . None did. The judge 
also asked if any of the prospective jurors 
believed that people should not resort to 
the courts to settle disputes or recover 
damages for injuries . Again, none did. 
The judge followed with a question asking 
whether any believed they were incapable 
of rendering a fair and true verdict based 
on the eyidence. None responded affirma-
tively. In their totality, and in context 
with the remainder of voir dire, these ques· 
tions are substantively responsi ve to plain-
tiff's concerns and appear sufficient to re-
veal "tort reform" bias in the manner dis-
cussed in Doe, 772 P.2d at 458-59. Plain-
tiff, therefore, has not shown an abuse of 
discretion in the court's voir dire of pro-
spective jurors . 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court im-
properly rejected his evidence on the iss ue 
of proximate cause, resulting in prejudicial 
error . All of this evidence was in the form 
of profiered testimon}r' " om two experts. 
The excluded evidence, ered a variety of 
topics, including a sc ientific theory referred 
to as the "moth phenomenon," certain fed-
eral motor carrier regula tions, road sa fety 
and des ign, and a videotape prepared for 
plaintiff that purported to show wha t 
would ha\'e happened if the semitrailer had 
not been unlawfully pa rked. 
(2) The general rule rega rding the ad-
mis sion or exclusion of evidence is that the 
tria l court's decision will not be o\'erturned 
in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 
Pearce v. lVistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 
1985). Witnesses qualified as exper ts may 
testify if "scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fa ct to und erstand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue. " Utah R.Evid. 702. 
However , "[i]t is within the discretion of 
the trial court to determine the suitability 
of expert testimony in a case and the quali-
fications of the proposed expert." State v. 
Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982) 
(decided un der former rule) . Although 
such testimony may be relevant, it may be 
excluded if the court determines "its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of 
t ime , or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence." Utah R.Evid. 403. The 
probative value of evidence is determined 
on the basis of ne ed and "its ability to 
make the existence of a consequential fact 
either more or less probable." State v. 
Joh nson, 115 Utah Adv.Rep. 6, 8 (1989) 
(quoting Sta te 1'. Will iams, 773 P.2d 1368, 
1370 (Utah 1989)). 
(3) We have examined the record and 
can find no abuse of discretion in the trial 
court's decision to exclude the testimony of 
two of plaintiff's seve n experts. I t is quite 
clear that the reason or reasons why Ste-
phen Ostler's vehicle slammed into the rear 
of Wheeler 's semitrailer could not be estab-
lished. Plaintiff's case r~lied significantly 
on scientific evidence of th e "moth phenom-
enon," a theory that motoris ts are "lured" 
at night to the lights of parked vehicles. 
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and prejudicial; court had already ruled 
that parking of truck was negligence as 
matter of law, and jury was as capable as 
expert in making determination of foresee-
ability. Rules of Evid., Rule 402. 
6. Automobiles <3=243(3) 
Question of how long truck had been 
parked on shoulder of highway prior to 
accident was properly excluded as irrele-
vant; evidence would ha\'e gone to issue of 
truck driver's negligence, which issue had 
already been resolved by directed verdict. 
7. Appeal and Error <3=1060.](8), 1060.6 
Negligence defendant's closing argu-
ment, reflecting fact that judgment could 
be entered against defendants, but not indi-
cating source of funds to pay such judg-
ment, was not unfairly prejudicial; defen-
dant did not improperly state that insur-
ance would or would not pay judgment and 
thus did not improperly elicit sympathy or 
temper size of any award. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 41l. 
8. Trial <3=133.6(4) 
Any harm in negligence defendant 's 
clos ing argument's misstatement of law of 
foreseeability was negated by court's ad-
monishment to disregard statements of 
counsel as to law, and look ' only to court's 
instructions. 
9. Trial <3=261 
Court properly rejected negligence 
plaintiff's suggested expansion of causa-
tion instruction; any expansion of given 
instruction would likely have impaired, 
rather than enhanced, jury's comprehen-
sion of issue . 
10. Automob il es <3=245(50) 
Issue of proximate cause in automobile 
accident was for jury; evidence tended to 
establish that proximate cause was not 
only in substantial dispute but was very 
essence of controversy between parties . 
Robert J. DeBry, Daniel F. Bertch, War-
ren W. Driggs, and Dale F. Gardiner (ar-
gued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and ap-
pellant. 
M. Dayle Jeffs (argued) and Robert L. 
Jeffs, Provo, for defendants, third-party 
plaintiffs and respondents. 
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BENCH, J udge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict 
against him in a negligence action. We 
affirm. 
On the night of April 18, 1984, plaintiff 
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father 
Stephen home to Utah from a business trip 
to California. At approximately 3:00 a.m., 
the Ostler's compact pickup was north-
bound on Interstate 15, a few miles south 
of Payson, Utah. Stephen Ostler was driv -
ing . For unknown reasons, the pickup left 
the lane of traffic and struck the rear of a 
truck and semitrailer unit parked on the 
paved shoulder of the roadway. Stephen 
Ostler was killed instantly. Plaintiff, who 
had been sleeping on the bed of the pickup, 
was thrown onto the roadway and critically 
injured. 
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist 
down as a result of his Injuries. He 
brought a personal injury action in the 
district court against the driver of the 
semitrailer (defendant Stanley E. Wheeler), 
the driver's employer (defendant Albina 
Transfer Co., Inc.), and the semitrailer 
owner (defendant F & R Roe, Inc.). Dur-
ing the five-day trial, plaintiff conceded 
that Stephen Ostler was negligent and par-
tially at fault for the accident. Earll' in the 
trial, the court determined that Wheeler 
was also negligent and directed a verdict of 
negligence against him. The basis for this 
ruling was that Wheeler had parked his 
semitrail er on the shoulder of a controlled 
access highway in violation of Ctah Code 
Ann. § 41- 6-103(1)(i) (1988). The court re-
sen'ed the issue of whether Wheeler 's neg-
ligence was a "proximate cause" of the 
accident. The jury eventually concluded 
that Stephen Ostler's negligence was the 
"intervening and sale proximate cause" of 
plaintiff's injuries, and rendered a special 
.... H.· .. " ,0 1 1· .• 'J ........ -> \LI .. Il .- \P p . I..,"''') 
litt le finger. The "ictim's rr ' -~e r als o tes · 
tified that the victim had be .. living with 
her grandmother since the night of the 
abuse because the victim was afraid of 
staying in the trailer home where the abuse 
had occurred. The presence of thi s evi-
dence in the record, along with the remedi-
al impact of the jury instruction , supports 
continued confidence in the jury's verdict. 
Therefore, I believe that the admission of 
the testimony was harmless, and I would 
affirm defendant's convictions. 
w "-_,,-,-=, 
o ~ ~!Y HUMB1R ~lS![M 
T 
Ralph OSTLER, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
ALBINA TRANSFER COMPANY, INC., 
Stanley E. Wheeler, and F & R Roe, 
Inc., Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
,', 
Wanda OSTLER, Stephen K. Ostler, Gary 
W. Ostler, Vyron R. Ostler, Dale F, Ost-
ler, Donnell B, Ostler, Sonda Mae 
Ostler, Ralph O. Ostler, Brian L. Ostler, 
Carlyle E. Ostler, Margaret Ostler, and 
Natha n J. Ostler, as heirs of Stephen 
Ostler, Gary Ostler, Dale Ostler, and 
Eugene Ostler, d / b/a Go Cars, Third-
Party Defendants. 
No. 880228-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 8, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 19, 1989. 
Injured automobile passenger brought 
action against dri"er and owner of other 
vehicle to recover for injuries . The Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Cullen Y. 
Christensen, J., entered judgment on jury 
verdict for defendants, and appeal was tak-
en. The Court of Appeals , Bench, J., held 
that: (1) exclusion of certain expert testi-
many was not abuse of('<cretion, an d (2) 
defense coun sel 's closir.·u argument was 
not unfairly prejudicial. 
Affirmed. 
1. Jury <'>131(8) 
Voir dire in automobil e accident case 
sufficiently addressed plaintiff's concerns 
of poten tial bias ag ainst large monetary 
awards where court, in lieu of plaintiff's 
proposed questions, asked jurors if they 
would object to awarding amount of dam-
ages being asked for and whether they 
were capable of rendering fair and true 
verdict based on evidence. 
2. Evidence =99 
Probative value of evidence is deter-
mined on basis of need and its ability to 
make existence of consequential fact more 
or less probable. Rules of E,·id., Rule 403. 
3. Evidence =555.80) 
Expert testimony regarding "moth 
phenomenon," offered in injured passen-
ger's suit to explain why driver veered off 
highway and struck parked truck, was 
properly excluded for lack of foundation; 
there was no evidence that driver was 
awake prior to night-time accident or that 
parked truck had lights on which would 
Hluref! driver. 
4. Evidence =359(6) 
Videotape of vehicle dri"ing off road-
way at actual accident location, purporting 
to show that no mishap would have oc-
curred had truck not been parked on road 
shoulder, was properly excluded from in-
jured passenger's negligence suit; video-
tape differed from actual accident in that it 
was produced during daylight conditions 
and employed alert, professional stunt driv-
er. Rules of Evid., Rules 401 , 403. 
5. Appeal and Error =1056.](3) 
Even if exclusion of federal motor 
carrier regulati ons and road safety and de-
sign evidence was error , in injured passen-
ger's action against owner of struck truck 
which had been illegally parked on shoul-
der of highway , reversal was not required 
absent showing that error was substantial 
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POINT I 
THE SUPERFICIAL TREATMENT OF THIS CASE 
._-----IS A GRAVE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE 
This is not Robert DeBry's case. Nor is this Dayle 
Jeff's case. Nor is this Judge Bench's case. No lawyer or 
judge s ho uld have a false pride in winning the case; or in 
l o sing the case; or in writing an opinion; or in changing an 
opi nion. Presumably, the attorneys o n bot h sides, as well as 
• 
the entire panel of judges, have a j o int goal of seeking jus-
lice . 
This is Ralph Ostler ' s case. Ralph Os t ler lost half 
} his body from the waist clown. He deserves a t houghtful, 
informed, reasoned analysis by each judge. Unfortunately , that 
is no·t what he got. What Ra l ph Ost l er got was a superficial 
Opinion that did not even touch on the core issues. Ra lph will 
spend his lifetime in a whee l chair. Surely his case merits a 
few extra hou r s of time by the judges. 
) Because of the superficial treatment of issues in this 
case , Ost.ler has employed an expert to determine whether the 
dec is ion makiny process has broken down in this case. The 
experts opinion is attached as Exhibit A. 
1 
) 
Ostler's expert is chairperson of the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Utah. Plaintiff's expert has 
rated the qual i ty of this Court ' s Opinion as a !2 or E grade. 
This is not intended to criticize or embarrass the Court. 
Rather, this is an attempt to assist the Court from committing 
a grave injustice. Hopefully the Court will be inclined t o 
thank counsel , rather than to retaliate. 
POINT II 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT 
FAILED TO FOLLOW BINDING AND RECEN'l' PRECEDENT 
FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
A major issue in the case was that Ostler's expert was 
not permitted to testify on the "moth phenomenon." The trial 
court reasoned that such testimony was not admissible until a 
foundation could be laid that father Ostler was awake just 
prior to the accident. (See Brief of Appellant at p. 6.) This 
court echoed the trial court's reasoning: 
[T 1 he theory was premised on the fact that a 
driver must be awake in order to be so "lured" 
. without this foundation, the Court deter-
mined that the expert testimony would not be 
helpful t o the jury . 
Slip Opinion, at p . 4. 
However, this Court overlooked the recent case o f 
Huddleston v. United States, 108 S . Ct. 1496; 99 L . Ed 2d 771 
(198 8 ): 
2 
'. 
) 
} 
In determining whether the government has 
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Ru le 
l04(b), the trial court neither weighs credibi-
lity nor ma kes a f inding that the government 
has proved the conditional fact by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The court simply ex-
amines a l l the evidence and decides whether the 
jury cou l d r easonabl y find the conditional 
fact . by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(Compare , Brief of Appellant at p . 6 & 7.) 
In this case , there was abu ndan t evidence from which 
t he jury cou l d have concluded t ha t father Ostler was awake. 
(See , Brief of Appellant at p . 4 & 5.) Contrary to Huddleston, 
t he trial court did not permit the evidence of the p r el iminary 
fact issue to go to the jury. Nor did the trial court apply 
the Iluddleston analysis. (viz, whether the j ury cou ld reason-
ab ly find from the evidence that father Ostler was awake. ) 
This is not a matter of discretion . Huddleston must be applied 
to the facts of this case. 
POINT III 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT FJ\ILED 
TO FOLLOW BINDING RECEN'l' PRECEDENT FROM 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
A second maj or issue i n the case was that defendant 
Wheeler had misstated the law i n his closing argument. ( See 
generally , Brief of Appel l ant at p. 33.) This Court's Opinion 
holds that any error was cured by the following comments of the 
judge: 
3 
The jury is directed to look at 
tions. They set forth the law in 
Statement of counsel is to be 
except as it is accurate. 
Slip Opinion, at p. 8 . 
the instruc-
that regard. 
disregarded 
However, this Court's Opinion was absolutely silent on 
the issue of whether such a statement was sufficient to cure 
the error. Strangely, this Court's Opinion relies upon Halford 
v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App. 1977). However, Halford, 
squarely holds that such comments by the Court are not suffi-
cient to cure the error. 
More import an tly, this Court's Opinion totally ignores 
the recent Utah Supreme Court case of State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). (See discussion at Brief of Appellant at 
p. 35 & 36.) A proper application of the Shickles case should 
have led to a reversal . 
POINT IV 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THIS COURT 
HAS FAILED TO CONSIDER THREE SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS 
IN THE COUR']" S JURY INS'rRUCTIONS 
Ostler challenged the Court's ins truction on indepen-
dent intervening cause on four grounds: first, failure to 
def ine the term intervening independent cause; second, that 
foreseeability is only one test (not the sole test) to deter-
mine causation; third, that only a generalized risk of harm 
4 
-, 
" .' 
need be foreseeable; and fourth , confusion. (See generally, 
Br i ef of Appellant at p. 56-58.) 
This Court's Opinion deals only with the fourth iss ue: 
viz. confusion. Rehearing is necessary to analyze the other 
three defects in the j ury instructions . 1 
Wit h respect to the fourth issue, this Court ruled that 
the confusion was no t "substantial or prejudicial". In Harris 
v. Utah Transit Authority , 671 P . 2d 217 (Utah 1983), the Su -
preme Court reversed, in part , upon the confus ion of an in-
struction o n superceding cause. 1 t is obvious that the Utah 
Supreme Court r egards confus i o n regarding s uperceding cause to 
be serious enough for reversal. 
POIN'r V 
REHEARING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE nTIS COURT'S OPINION 
FAILED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF LIAB I LITY 
There were two theories of liability: 
First, that Wheeler was unlawfully parked on the side 
of the road in violation of §41 -6-10 3(i)(i). As this Court has 
poi nted out , tha"t theory was conceded by t he defense , and the 
1 It is true that the Court did instruct the jury on 
concurrent neglige nce . (Slip opinion p. 9.) However, concur -
rent negligence does no t .. f ill the gap . " The instruction on 
co ncurrent negligence does not inform the jury of the dividing 
line between concurrent cause and intervening cause. 
5 
Court directed a verdict on liability (but reserved on proxi-
mate cause) . 
The second theory of liability was that Wheeler was 
parked on a controlled access highway for more than 10 minutes. 
This theory was not conceded. 
However, this Court has failed to appreciate that the 
chain of causation is different depending upon which theory of 
liability applies. Thus, a truck parked for less than 10 min-
utes must simply turn on blinking lights. But a truck parked 
for more than 10 minutes must additionally put out flares or 
triangles. (See generally, Brief of Appellant at p. 12. ) 
Ostler's expert exclaimed that flares and triangles offer an 
additional measure of protection for the passing motorist and 
that the accident could have been avoided if this additional 
warning had been in place. (Transcript, 232-233, 284.) In 
short, the absence of flares is an additional basis for proxi-
mate cause. This Court's Opinion simply overlooked this 
second theory of liability. 
POINT VI 
REHEAHING IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT 
HAS OVERLOOKED RES'l'ATEMEN'l' 442 AND 447 
This Court gl ossed over the claim for a directed ver-
dict by saying that it was a jury issue. However, our Supreme 
6 
• 
" 
, 
Court has adopted Section 442 of the Restatement 2 . If this 
Court also accepts Section 447 of the Restatement, there is no 
jury issue. The result must follow as a matter of logic. In-
deed, the illustration of Section 447 of the Restatement is 
very similar to tllis case: 
A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight 
jolt might cause its heavy contents to fall 
from it. He parks it in a street where to his 
knowledge small boys congrega te for play. B, 
aile of the boys, tri.es to climb on the truck. 
In so doing, he disturbs the load as he causes 
a heavy article to fall upon and hurt C, a 
comraue s tanding close by. B' s act is not a 
superseding cause of C's harm. 
Reply Brief of Appellant at Appendix Two. 
To dispose of Ostler's motion for a directed verdic t 
without analyzing the interplay between. Sectiun 442 and 447 of 
the Restatement is grossly superficial . 
DATED this :2./ day of ,iCf-rZ;2-r--k ,1989 . 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2 llarris v. Utah Transit Authority, (Utah 1983j~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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671 P.2d 217, 219 
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IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
refused to follow binding precedence of this courL 
2 . Certiorari is proper because of the unusual 
course of proceedings in the Court of Appeals. 
3 . Certiorari is proper because this court has 
already granted certiorari on an identical issue. 
4 . Certiorari is proper because the Utah Court of 
Appeals refused to consider an alternate theory of liability. 
5. Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
refused to consider Ostler's expert testimony. 
6 . Certiorari is proper because the Court of Appeals 
did not give adequate consideration to defects in jury 
instructions. 
V. 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
This case is reported at 117 Utah Adv.Rep. P.2d 14 
(Utah 1989). (See Appendix . ) 
VI. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTI ON 
The Court of Appeals Opinion was filed on September 8, 
1989 . On October 18, 1989, rehearing was denied. 
On October 26, 1989, this court granted enlargement of 
time for filing a petition for certiorar i to December 15, 1989 . 
This court has power to grant certiorari pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78 - 2- 2 and Rules 42-48 of the Supreme Court. 
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VII . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a collision between a vehicle and a 
semi - truck illegally parked on an interstate highway. A jury 
returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed on various 
grounds . The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Plaintiff seeks certiorari and asks this court to 
review legal issues which were presented to the Court of Appeals. 
VIII. 
FACTS 
The basic facts of the case are as follows: 
On the night of Apr i l 18, 1984 , plaintiff 
Ralph Ostler was accompanying his father 
Stephen home to Utah from a business t rip to 
California . At approximately 3:00 a.m., the 
Ostler's compact pickup was northbound on 
Interstate 15 , a few miles south of Payson, 
Utah. Stephen Ostler was driving. For 
unknown reasons, the p i ckup left the lane of 
traffic and struck the rear of a truck and 
semi trailer unit parked on the paved shoulder 
of t he roadway . Stephen Ostler was killed 
instantly. Plaintiff, who had been sleeping 
in t he back of the pickup, was thrown onto 
the roadway and critically injured. 
Plaintiff was paralyzed from the waist down 
as a result of his injuries . He brought a 
personal injury action in the district court 
against the driver of the semitrailer 
(defendant Stanley E. Wheeler), the driver's 
employer (defendant Albina Transfer Co . , 
Inc . ), and the semitrailer owner (defendant F 
& R Roe, Inc . ) . During the five - day tria l , 
plaintiff conceded that Stephen Ostler ( the 
father), was negligellt and partially at fault 
for the accident . Early in the trial , the 
court determined that Wheeler was also 
negligent and directed a verdict of 
negligence against him. The bas is for this 
ruling was that Wheeler had parked Ilis 
2 
I 
'-
I , \.., ~ .. 
semitrailer on the shoulder of a controlled 
access highway in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 41 - 6- 103(1)(i) (1988), The c ourt reserved 
the issue of whether Wheeler's negligence was 
a "proximate cause" of the accident , The 
jury eventually concluded that Stephen 
Ostler's negligence was the "intervening and 
sole proximate cause" of the plaintiff's 
injuries , and rendered a special verdict for 
defendants , 117 Utah Adv, Rep, at 14, 
IX, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
REFUSED TO FOLLOW BINDING PRECEDENCE OF THIS COURT 
It is clear that the rule of superceding causation set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 ( 196 5) has been 
adopted, Harris v, Utah Transit Authority 671 P,2d 217 (Utah 
1983), In Godesky v, Provo City Corp " 690 P,2d 541, 545 (Utah 
1984) this court held : 
An intervening negligent act does not 
automatically become a superceding cause that 
relieves the original actor of liability , 
The earlier actor is charged with the 
foreseeable negligent acts of others , 
Therefore, if the intervening negligence is 
foreseeable, the earlier negligent act is a 
concurring cause, 
Ha rris v, Utah Trans i t Authority, supra , holds that 
once the negligence of one stopping (parking) a vehicle is 
established, the ne gligence of a subsequent driver is not a 
superceding cause unless it is "so extraordinary as to be 
unforeseeable," 671 P,2d at 220, Ba rr is havi ng adopted the 
Restatement position on superceding cause, further states that 
the focus of the trial should be on a comparison of the relative 
3 
fault of the parties . Id, at 222. 
In t h is case, the principles set forth in § 447 of the 
Restatement were not followed by the Court of Appeals in 
rendering its decision. This is a clear departure by the Court 
of Appeals from the standards set by this court in Harris, supra 
and Godesky , supra . 
Utah Code Ann.§ 41 - 6- 103( 1 )(i) states : 
No person 
park a 
controlled 
shall : stop, stand or 
vehicle. .on allY 
access highway. 
Based upon this statute, the trial court directed a 
verdict of negligence against defendant. However, the Court 
reserved the issue of proximate cause which should have been 
decided based upon Restatement § 447 . 
Ostler offered evidence that the purpose of this 
statute was to safeguard errant (sleepy or sleeping or 
distracted) drivers. For example: 
Parked tractor trailers on shoulders of our 
high speed highways introduce unnecessary 
obstacles in the clear recovery area. (R. 
1359.) 
Ultimately , 
been there, 
occurred. (R. 
if the parked 
an accident 
1368. ) 
vehicle 
might 
had not 
not have 
Compare Laird v . Travelers Insurance Co ., 267 So. 2d 
714, 718 (La. 1972): 
. [T]his statute [parking on the highway) 
is designed to protect against the risk that 
a driver, whether cautious or inat tenti ve, 
would collide with a stationary vehicle . Id. 
In this case we have exactly the type of accident which 
the statute sought to avoid. A truck parked in the emergency 
4 
lane. An errant (sleepy or distracted) driver drifted into the 
emergency lane and hit the truck . 
This scenar i o triggers the application not only of 
Section 447 of the Restatement , but also Sections 442A and 4428 1 . 
The risk of an errant driver striking a truck parked on 
the shoulder of the interste.te is a foreseeable risk which ·the 
statute was intended to remedy. Under Restatement Sections 
442A, 442B and 447, the occurrence of the very event the statute 
was designed to prevent precludes a finding that the negligence 
of Father Ostler was an intervening cause. The focus of Harris, 
supra, is a comparison of the relative fault of the two negligent 
parties under the comparative negligence statute instead of (as 
allowed by the trial court in this case) a defense based upon the 
fact that the negligent truck driver did not foresee the specific 
negligence of Father Ostler. Harris, supra, at 222. The defense 
at trial effectively overruled the principles of the Restatement 
Sections (442A , 442B & 447) as well as the principles set out by 
this court in Harris and Godesky, supra . If allowed to stand , 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case effectively 
overrules the principles of Restatement Sections 442A, 4428, and 
447 and is a distinct departure from the principles set out in 
Harris and Godesky. 
As a matter of law, it was not .. highly extraordinary" 
to suspect that an errant driver might drift onto the emergency 
IGiven the adoption by this court of Sect.ion 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), this court 
specifically adopt and follow Sections 442A and 4428. 
5 
447 o f lhe 
should also 
lane. Indeed, the statute assumes that errant drivers will 
stray . c.f. Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra . 
Ostler's expert testified it was common knowledge 
among truck drivers that errant drivers often stray onto the 
emergency lane. (Tr. 286, 864 - 865.) 
Plaintiff asked the trial court to direct a verdict on 
the issue of superceding and proximate cause. The trial court 
refused. Having so refused, plaintiff should have been allowed 
an instruction on the applicable law under Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 442A, 442B & 447 . (See Point IV.) The similarities 
between the Illustration to the comment on clause (a) in 
Restatement § 447 and the present case is striking. 
The said comment reads: 
A loads his truck so carelessly that a slight 
jolt might cause its heavy contents to fall 
from it. He parks it in a street where to his 
knowledge small boys congregate for play . B, 
one of the bOYS, tries to climb on the truck. 
In so doing, he disturbs the load as he 
causes a heavy article to fall upon and hurt 
C, a comrade standing close by . B' s act is 
not a superseding cause of C's harm. 
A similar comparison could be made to Comment (b) to 
Section 442A and to Illustration 2 thereunder . 
If under either Section 442A, 442B or 447 a directed 
verdict was not proper, the trial court should then have 
instructed the jury with respect to the Restatement principles 
found in Sections 442A, 442B & 447. See Point V. The Court of 
Appeals ignored this issue and held the trial court's 
instructions adequate. 
6 
It would appear proper for this court to grant 
certiorari for the purpose of resolving the following: 
a) Why the Court of Appeals ignored the provisions of 
Restatement § 442A, 442B & 447 as well as the 
precedents set in Godesky, supra; and Harris. 
b) vlhether it is appropriate for a trial court to 
direct a verdict on the issues of superceding 
cause and/or proximate cause in cases where 
negligence resulting from violation of a statute 
is admitted and the asserted superceding cause is 
an act clearly intended to be protected by the 
statute. 
c) What type of jury instruction should be given to 
allow the issues raised by Sections 442A , 442B and 
447 of the Restatement to be properly presented to 
the jury? 
The trial court should also have allowed full 
development of plaintiff's second theory of negligence and 
proximate cause, i.e. that the failure of the truck driver to 
place warning devices was negligence and a proximate cause of the 
injury. Failure to allow this alternative theory to be developed 
was brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals, but was not 
adequately covered in the Opinion. See, Point IV, infra . 
This clearly appears to depart from Harris where the 
court held that a plaintiff is entitled to present all of his 
theories to tile jury. It is reversible error to preclude 
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presentment of a valid theory of recovery. 671 P . 2d at 222. 
In closing argument , defendant's counsel misstated the 
law to the jury2. Plaintiff objected. The trial court did not 
sustain or overrule the objection. The trial court stated : "the 
jury is directed to look at the instructions. They set forti, the 
law in that regard. Statement of counsel is to be disregarded 
except as it is accurate." 117 Utah Adv. Rep . at 17. The issue 
is whether the instruction of the trial court removed the 
prejudice of the misstatement. The Court of Appeals stated: 
Even if counsel's remarks misstated the law, 
any prejudicial impact appears to be negated 
by the courts admonishment. 117 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 17. (Emphasis added.) 
The holding ignores this court's ruling in State v . 
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, (Utah 1988) . 
In Shickles , this court held that if the trial court 
failed to act to dispel erroneous statements of counsel by (1) 
rul ing on the objection 'vhen made, and (2) instructing the jury 
with positive correction to the misstatement, reversal is 
required. 760 P . 2d at 299 - 300. 
In this case the court (1) did not rule on the 
obj ection, and (2) told the jury to refer to the ins tructions. 
Notwithstanding, Shickles, supra, the Court of Appeals held this 
not to be error. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17. Certiorar i is 
certainly appropriate to correct such a misapprehension. 
2It is reversible error 
closing argument. 
358 (1927) . 
Jensen v. 
for counsel to misstate the law in 
Utah Railway, 72 Utah 366 , 370 P.2d 
8 
POINT II 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL COURSE 
OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
states that certiorar i is appropriate where the Court of Appeals 
has " . .departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings." This case involves such a departure. 
A part of the record of the Court of Appeals is an 
affidavit by Ms. Patricia Hannah, Ph. D. (See Appendix.) 
Hannah is Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Utah. This affidavit was filed in support of 
Ostler ' s Petition for Reconsideration in the Utah Court of 
Appeals 3 . In substance, the affidavit is a 21 page analysis of 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals . The affidavit states in 
part : 
I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. 
However, I am trained in logic and argumen-
tation. Indeed, the field of philosophy is 
in large measure devoted to the study of 
arguments and the process of analytic 
reasoning. I have taught classes in 
deductive and inductive logic, as well as in 
3 Basic considerations of due process demand that a 
litigant be given an opportunity to be heard on all pertinent 
issues raised by his case at both the trial and appellate level. 
In every instance the litigant is entitled by due process to have 
the court consider and deal with all issues fairly raised. It is 
clearly an unusual step to have the head of the Dept. of 
Philosophy at the University of Utah comment on a Court Opinion. 
Certainly that should not be an every day tool of the trial 
advocate . Nor was that step taken lightly. However, it i s a 
serious matter when a Court Opinion cannot muster a passing grade 
on a college level . Hopefully, the Court will not criticize 
counsel for this unusual step. Hopefully, the court will value 
this input, as it undertakes the serious task of supervising the 
irlferior courts of this state. 
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epistemology (theory 
scientific inquiry. 
( 
of knowledge) and 
.(p.2 paragraph 3.) 
I have been asked by Robert J. DeBry to read 
the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Ost ler v. Albina, et al. I have been asked 
to render an opinion of that Opinion. Since 
I am not an attorney, I have not been asked 
to determine if the Opinion is right or 
wrong. Ra ther, I have been asked to 
determine the extent to which the Opini.on 
fairly analyzes issues raised in the briefs. 
(p.2, paragraph 4.) 
I have read the briefs of both parties, the 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, and I have 
had trial transcripts available for cross-
checking . (p .2, paragraph 5.) 
In my opinion, this Opinion reflects a 
breakdown in the decision making process. If 
this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a 
course, I would have gi.ven it a grade of "D"; 
from a graduate student, it would have 
counted as failing work. (p . 2, paragraph 6.) 
I can only conclude that in reading its 
decision, the Court of Appeals failed to take 
into account many important aspects of the 
arguments made in the appeal. (p.20 . ) 
In summary, there is a good faith basis to believe 
that there has been a breakdown in the decision making process 
at the Court of Appeals. At a minimum, the Court of Appeals 
treatment of many issues raised in the briefs was grossly 
superficial . Certiorari should be granted to correc t such 
superficial work of an inferior court and to allow the serious 
issues presented in this appeal to receive the type of judicial 
review to which they are entitled to provide due process of low 
to plaintiff herein. Basic due process considerations mandate a 
fair and adequate consideration and resolution of the issues 
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presented to an appeals court. A real question exists in the 
present case as to whether such was done in the present case. 
POINT III 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THIS COURT 
HAS ALREADY GRANTED CERTIORARI ON AN IDENTICAL 
ISSUE IN ANOTHER PENDING CASE 
In the trial court, Ostler submitted evidence of a 
recent advertising campaign by insurance companies designed to 
scare the public about jury awards. (R. 1255-1273.) The 
capstone to this advertising program was a letter by Farmers 
Insurance Group . The letter was sent to all policy holders 
shortly prior to this trial. The letter states in part: "You 
pay for plaintiff's lawyers." (See Appendix.) 
Ostler submitted various voir dire questions inquiring 
about jury attitudes regarding this "tort reform" publicity. In 
particular, Ostler asked which of the prospective jurors were 
covered by Farmers Insurance 3 . 
The trial court refused to give Ostler's requested voir 
dire questions. The Court 0 f Appeal s a f firmed. In so dOing, 
the Court of Appeals relied on its reasoning in Doe v . Hafen, 772 
P.2d 455 (Utah App. 19 89) the court stated: 
I n their total i ty, and in context with the 
remainder of voir dire, their questions are 
substantially responsive to plaintiff's 
concerns and appear sufficient to revea l 
"tort reform" bias in the manner discussed in 
Doe. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. 
3Eac l1 jl,ror covered by Farmers would have received Exhibit 
B shortly before the trial. Farmers was also the insurance 
carrier defending the case on behalf of defendant. 
11 
However, this court has recently granted certiorari in 
Doe v. Hafen. (See Exhibit C, Appendix . ) Since this case and 
Doe v. Hafen involve identical threshold issues (viz. jury voir 
dire) and since this court has already granted certiorari to 
review Doe v. Hafen, it would be a matter of judicial economy for 
this court to consider both cases together4 . It would seem 
unjust for Ostler to lose his case in part based upon the 
reliance by the Court of Appeals on the case of Doe v. Hafen if 
Doe were to be subsequently overturned by this Court. 
POINT IV 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REFUSED TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATE THEORY OF LIABILITY 
There were two theories of liability. First, the 
defendant had illegally parked in the emergency lane ; and such 
negligent parking was a proximate cause of the accident. On this 
issue, the trial court directed a verdict on negligence, but 
reserved the issue of proximate cause. 
The second theory of liability was that defendant had a 
( federal) duty to set out f lares or triangles 5; and tha t the 
failure to put out such warning devices was a proximate cause of 
the accident. The court did not direct a verdict on this issue. 
In three separate portions of the opinion, the Court of 
4 See , Robert L . 
Shapiro, Supreme Court 
Stern, Eugene 
Practice, p . 221 
Gressman 
(1986) . 
and Steven H. 
5Federal regulations require truckers 
triangles, "as soon as possible, but in 
to put out flares or 
any event within 10 
minutes. 49 C.F.R . § 322. 
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Appeals addressed the issue of negligence for failure to put out 
flares and triangles. On each occasion , the Court of Appeals 
refused to even consider the issue. 
We last address plainti ff' s claim of error 
regarding the exclusion of evidence on 
federal motor carrier regulations. 
[This) evidence goes to the issue of 
Wlleeler's negligence, a matter previously 
decided by directed verdict, and may be 
excluded as irrelevant . 117 Utah Adv . Rep. at 
16. 
* * * 
Plaintiff argues that the court's refusal to 
permit him to s how that Wheeler had been 
parked on the shoulder of the highway for as 
long as 30 minutes unduly restricted cross-
examination. 
It is unnecessary to resolve this argument 
when the alternate basis for the court's 
ruling is considered, namely that the 
questions of how long Wheeler had been parked 
ultimately goes to the issue of Wheeler's 
negligence . Since that issue has been 
resol ved by directed verdict. The excluded 
testimony was irrelevant . Id. 
* * * 
Plaintiff further assigns as error two jury 
instructions. The first instruction involves 
the placement of emergency warni.ng devices 
behind Wheeler's parked truck . We agree that 
the given instructio n s igni f icantly di f fers 
from plaintiff's requested instruction . 
However, the instruction concerned the issue 
of Wheeler's negligence . We have already 
established that this issue had been take n 
from the jury. Any error could not have 
affected the substantial rights of plaintiff 
and was therefore, harmles s . 117 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 17. 
However, there was an a serious flaw in that reasoning. 
The chain of causation f o r negligent parking is different from 
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the chain of causation for failure to put out warning flares . 
If the defendant did not cause the accident by parking illegally; 
he may well have caused the accident by failing to put out 
emergency flares. I f Stephen Ostler was awake , the f lares or 
triangles may have guided him around the danger area. If Ostler 
was asleep, driving over the triangles would have caused a noise 
awakening the driver. (Tr. 232 - 34, 284 . ) A completely 
independent act of negligence was kept from the jury by the trial 
court's rulings and the Court of Appeals glossed over this issue 
without even a discussion of its merits. 
The Court of Appeals held that negligence for failure 
to place flares was irrelevant because defendant was already 
negligent for illegal parking. The jury could conclude 
otherwise . The jury could find no proximate cause for the 
illegal parking; but that, there was proximate cause for failing 
to put out flares . The opinion of the Court of Appeals ignores 
this possibility. Clearly, a refusal to allow a theory of 
recovery be presented to a jury is error. Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority, supra. The Court of Appeals ignored the precedent of 
Harris and affirmed the decision of the trial court. 
POINT V 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE TIlE COURT OF APPEALS 
REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY 
BY OSTLER'S EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Stephen Ostler (plaintiff's father) drifted off the 
dr iving lanes, and crashed into the rear of defendants' parked 
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truck. A central issue is why . The defense argued t ha t he was 
asleep . Plaintiff's expert proffered testimony that he was 
"lured" off the road by the illegally parked truck . This 
scientific phenomenon is sometimes referred to as t he "moth 
The trial court refused to receive evidence of the 
"moth effect" . The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of 
Appeals stated: 
Even if such a theory is admissible under the 
threshold requirement of inherent reliability 
[c i ta tion omitted 1 . The theory is premised 
on the fact that a driver must be awake to be 
lured. 117 Utah Adv . Rep. at p. 15 . 
Thu s, a foundation issue \-las \-lhether Stephen Ostler 
(father) \-las a\-lake or had his eyes open7 so he could be lured 8 . 
On this issue Ostler relied upon Rule 104 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
6For example , California Highway Patrol cars are struck 
approximately 15 times per month while parked with flashing 
lights. Upon the advise of Ost ler's expert , the CalifoJ:nia 
Highway Patrol has done a\-lay ''lith off and on flashers . (Tr . 
231 . ) Indeed , the Federal Department of Transportation has 
recently recognized the "moth effect" as an industry wide 
problem . (Tr . 284 . ) 
7 De fendants offered a series of night - time photos of the 
parked truck. The foundation for the night - time photos was that 
Ostle r's eyes were open . Ostler thereupon proffered evidence on 
the "moth ef feet" as rebuttal testimony . Thus, the foundation 
for defendants photos and plaintiff's moth effect theol:y was 
identical, viz . that Ostler's eyes were open . The Court of 
Appeals , likewise, ignored this crucial issue . (See Exhibit F.) 
80stler's experts gave five 
Stephen Ostler \-las awake (so that 
reasons are summarized at Exhibit G. 
all of this proffered testimony. 
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reasons to conclude that 
he could be lured) . The 
The trial court rejected 
Evidence 9 and Huddleston v. United States , U.S. 108 
S.CT. 1496, 99 L.ed. 2d 771 (1988) . 
In Huddleston, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has recently stated: 
In determining whether the government has 
introduced suf fie ient evidence to meet Rule 
104(b), the trial court neither weighs 
credibility nor makes a finding that tIle 
government has proved the conditional fact by 
a preponderance of the evidence . The court 
simply examines all the evidence in the case 
and decides whether the jury could reasonably 
find the conditional fact . .by a prepon -
derance of the evidence. 99 L.ed. 2d at 782-
83. 
Clearly the jury should have been allowed to decide 
whether Father Ostler was awake or asleep . To exc 1 ude the 
evidence of the expert witnesses on the ground there was no 
proof Father Ostler was awake begs the question. Under Rule 
104(b) the evidence should have been admitted and then the jury 
instructed they could consider it only if they believed Father 
Ostle r was awake. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the moth effects exists, and 
it being at issue whether Father Ostler was awake , it is proper 
for the jury to consider moth effect as an explanation for the 
collision . IIarris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra. Given the 
language of Rule 104(b) and the Supreme Courts holding in 
Huddleston, the treatment of this issue by the Court of Appeals 
9 "When t.he 
ful fillment of a 
upon , or subject 
s upport a finding 
relevancy of evidence depe nd s upon ti,e 
condition of fact, the court shall admit it 
to , the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
of the fulfillment of the condition ." 
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in this case is superficial. No attempt was made to discuss 
Huddleston or Harris and no reasoned explanation was given as to 
why the evidence should not have been allowed. 
POINT VI 
CERTIORARI IS PROPER BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
DID NOT GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO DEFECTS 
IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
The core issue in this case is vihether the trucker's 
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident . Or r \-las 
Stephen Ostler' s 10 negligence the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. 
The law on this issue was purportedly presented by the 
trial court's Instruction No. 27 . (See Appendix.) 
In the trial court, Ostler challenged Instruction No . 
27 on four grounds : 
a) fai.lure of the jury instruction to define the term 
independent intervening cause; 
b) foreseeabil i ty is only one test (not the sole 
test) to determine causation; 
c) only a generalized risk of harm need be 
foreseeable; 
d) confusion. 
The Court of Appeals only dealt with confusion. The 
other three issues are serious matters supported by abundant 
10Stephen Ostler was the father of plaintiff Ralph Ostler . 
Stephen Ostler was driving . Ralph Ostler was asleep. 
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authorityll. The Court of Appeals departed from acceptable 
judicial standards by refusing to even consider these crucial 
issues. 
X. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUHENT 
Stephen Ostler was preparing to go on an L.D.S . 
Hission. He was returning with his father from a visit in 
California. Father Ostle r was driving and Stephen was sleeping. 
The Ostler car hit an illegally parked truck. Father Ostler was 
killed immediately. Stephen Ostler (the plaintiff in this 
action) was paralyzed from the waist down . This case does not 
include any claims by Father Ostler. 
During a jury trial, plaintiff admitted that Father 
Ost l er was negl i ge nt and partly at fault in causing the accident 
(fo~ drifting onto the emergency lane where the truck was 
illegally parked). The central issue at trial was proximate 
cause. Was the trucker's negligence in parking illegally in the 
emergency lane or in fail ing to put out warning devices as 
required by Federal law a proximate cause of the accident. The 
trial court refused to allow plaintiff to develop his alternate 
theory of liability based upon failure to put out warning 
devices. 
lIThe sole issue treated by the Court of Appeals was 
confusion. This completely ignores Restatement § 442A and 4428, 
the other elements of Section 447 and the court's holdings in 
Harris and Godes),¥., supra. The Court of Appeals concluded the 
instruction was not confusing . However, it was absurd to 
conclude that Instruction No . 27 was understandable to a lay 
person , and it certainly misstated the l aw. 
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The jury returned a verdict for defendant. 
of Appeals affirmed . 
The Court 
The head of the Department of Philosophy at the 
Unive r sity of Utah ( Dr. Patrici a Hannah) made a 21 page analysis 
of the Op i nion of the Court of Appeals. (See Appendix.) Hs. 
Hannah testified that she was not a lawyer; and thus she could 
no t conunent o n the correctness of the opinion . However , 115 . 
Hannah testified that she has considerable expertise in and 
teaches logic and argumentation . I1s. Hannah summarized that if 
the opinion were writ ten by an undergraduate s ludent, she would 
give a "D" grade for the analysis. A graduate student would get 
a failing grade . 
Appeals : 
Among other things, the Opinion of the Court o f 
a) Ignores the position of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts on independent intervening c ause. 
b) Almost totally ignores the central issue o f 
whether the jury was properly instructed on 
independent intervening cause. 
c) Ignores the Utah Rules 0 f Evidence and recent 
precedent from the United States Supreme Court 
with respect to foundation of expert testimony . 
d) Failed to follow binding precedent o f this court 
on the sufficiency of curative instructions and to 
apply Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447. 
e) Ignored an a lternative theory of liability. 
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Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
states that certiorari may be proper where the lower court, 
. has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings. " 
Ralph Ostler will be tied to his wheelchair for a 
lifetime. He will ponder for his lifetime why the Court of 
Appeals did not even consider his arguments o n appeal. He will 
wonder for his lifetime whether he go t true justice when the 
head of the Department of Phil o sophy gave the Opinion a failing 
grade. 
Certiorari should be granted where the Court of Appeals 
ill rendering its opinion in this case has failed to follow 
established precedent and has made such a radical departure from 
the traditional high standards of the Bench in Utah. 
DATED this ly-0- day of O-€./'~~ , 1989. 
0566-128 \ jn 
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Att orneys f o r Plaintiff 
,/) 
~~~/ 4 '-:;-j v/ BY/~f{ We, /7~_ 
EDWARD T , WELLS ' 
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APPENDIX 4 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
OF & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
PATRICIA HANNA 
Case No. 88-00228-CA 
____ ~D~e~f~e~n~d~a~n~ts~. ______________ ) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
) 
) 
ss. 
My name is Patricia Hanna. I give the following testimony under 
oath: 
1. hold a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Cincinnati. 
2. am chairperson of the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah . 
I\ffidClvit of Patricia .anna Page 2 
3. I am not a lawyer nor am I trained in law. However, I am trained 
In logic and argumenta tion. Indeed, the field of philosophy is in large 
measure devoted to the study of arguments and the process of ana lytic 
reaso ning. I have taught classes in deductive and inductive logic, as well 
as in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and scientific inquiry. My 
curricu lum vita is attach ed . 
4. I have been asked by Robert J. OeBry to read the Opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Albina et al. I have been asked to 
render an opinion of that Opinion. Since I am not an attorney, I have not 
been asked to determine if the Opinion is right or wrong. Rather, I have 
been asked to determine the extent to wh ich the Opinion fai rly analyzes 
issues raised in the briefs. 
5. I have read the brie fs of both parties, the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, and I have had trial transcripts availab le for cross-checking . 
6. In my op inion, thi s Opinion reflects a breakdown in th e decision 
making process . If this Opinion had been written by one of my 
undergraduate students as an exercise in a course" I would have given it a 
grade of '0;' from a graduate student, it would have counted as failing 
work. 
7. In my op inion , it is difficult to understand how this Opinion could 
have been endorsed by three judges. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings /- a single individual might fa il to g rasp the points at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's argum ents ; however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three ind ividuals could all have made the same errors 
in analys is. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
sing le judge (Bench) , and that the other two judges signed it without 
giving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analys is wh ich they 
deserved and required. 
8. My detai led analys is of the Court's Opinio n follows: 
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General Structure of Appeal 
There is an underlying argument In the appeal which ties together 9 
of the initial 11 points in the Appellant's Substitute Brief (Points I, II, III , 
IV, V, VII, IX, X and XI); without an understanding of this argument, the 
merit of these points cannot be properly assessed or appreciated. In 
addition, Point VI is substantively affected by the issues involved in the 
above mentioned 9 points.' Unless the appeal is viewed in terms of the 
unifying argument, it is in my judgment impossible to appreciate its full 
fo rce. 
The 
In the very roughest 
case of Ralph Ostler 
terms, the 
(hereafter, 
underlying argument comes to this. 
Ostler) against Stanley Wheeler 
(hereafter, Wheeler)et at. cannot be resolved without a decision on the 
issues of prox imate cause, superseding intervening independent cause and 
division of liability. In order forlJbe jury to reach a reasoned conclusion 
on these issues, it would have to be given access to certain facts and/or 
scientifically or factually based theor ies, and to be given a clear 
presentation of the law as it bears on these issues; in the absence of such 
access, either the Jury cou ld not fulfill its respons ibility or it should have 
been given a directed verdict against Wheeler on causation, and asked only 
to determine the extent of Wheeler'S liability. 
In the Court of Appeals' decision, several failures in assessment 
recur. First, the Court of Appeals fails to account for the interrelated 
nature of the arguments in the appeal; if each point is taken individually 
and out of context, it is impossible to reach a sound judgment on the 
plaintiff's case. Second, the Court of Appeals shows absolutely no 
appreciation of the fact that certain circumstances or facts may have a 
bearing on more than one aspect of the case. This is most evident in the 
case of negligence and proximate cause. While it might be understandable 
, The Appellate Court makes no ruling on thi s aspect of the appeal, and hence offers no 
argumentation supporting its de facto denial of tile appeal. This seems a significant omission 
given IIlat the point is discussed in the Appellant's Substitute Brief on pp. 38-40, and in the 
Reply Br ief on pp. 45-48. 
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that the trial judg e, under the va rious tim e constraints and pressures 
imposed by an on-go ing trial , might fail to appreciate thi s point, one 
would suppose th at th e appeals process is in part intended to correct for 
thi s by allow ing three judges wh o have more tim e and distance to reflect 
on the matter. Thi s does not seem to have been the case; consequently, I 
can only conclude that the decision making process suffered a se rio us 
breakdown in the present case. 
In what follows, I sha ll ind icate how this argument is made and 
sustained throu ghou t the documentation presented to the Court of Appea l 
on Ralph Ostler's beha lf, and indicate how and where the Court of Appeal > 
decis ion to reject the appeal fails to take account of or the address the 
points raised by Ostler's counsel. I shall comment only on the 9 po ints 
involved in the argument, and the judgments reached on thes e points. 
Ass umot ions 
There is no d ispute on the following: Whee ler negligently parked h 
semi-truck in th e emergency lane on 1-1'5 between Santaquin and Payson . 
Utah. He failed to set out flashe rs or tr iangles mark ing the presence of 
hi s truck , and at @ 2:00 a.m. (P .S.T.), Stephen Ostler's (hereafter fath er 
Ostler) pick-up truck, with Ostler asleep in the bed of the truck, ran intr 
the back of Wheeler's truck. Throughout, I w ill take the se as. given. 
Point 
Th is contains the clearest statement of the general argument of II' 
appeal , and sets th e stage for wh at follows. It is argued that although c. 
major portion of th e trial revo lved around the issue of proximate cause , 
almos t all of the evidence pro ffe red by Ostler was rejected by the trial 
court. As a result, when the tr ial court r efus ed to direct a verdict agai r 
Wheeler on the issue of causation, on the grounds th at it is a matter of 
fact which should prope rl y be determined by the jury (Point XI), the Jury 
had seen none of the ev idence which Ostler considered relevant thi s 
decision . 
In th e absence of clear proof that this evidence lacked all merit, 
th is creates a se rio us problem for both p rocedura l and substantive 
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fa irn ess . In rejecting Ostle r' s evidence, the trial court gives either no 
indication that the reason for denying th e jury access to the evidence was 
that the evidence was entirely without merit. 2 Instead , the evidence is 
rej ected on at least one of three grounds: 1. because it was held to be 
irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation, 2. because it was felt that 
it would confuse the ju rors, and 3. because it was felt that the jurors 
already were fully aware of th e phenomena. Th e appeal argues that th ese 
grounds are all inadequate.3 
1. The "moth-phenomenon " Wheeler'S failure to usp, emergencv devices, 
and denial of presentation of 're-created' accident without trllck in 
emergency lane 
The evidence related to the moth phenomenon consists in a theory, 
which is said to be widely recognized, that at night tail -lights, whether 
fl ash ing or not , have a tendency to "lure" sleepy drivers towards them, 
much as a moth is drawn to a light. Thu s, if father Ostler was awake at 
the time of the accident, Wheeler'S tail- lights might have exerted this 
"lu ring " effect on him, causi ng him to drive into the back of Wheeler' s 
truck. 
In the case of the emergency devices, flares and/or triang les, Ostler 
was not allowed to introduce into evidence expert testimony that had such 
devices been in place, the accident would most likely have been avoided. 
One of the expert witnesses "re-created" the acc ident at the exact 
location, and concluded on the basis of this recreation that if the truck 
had not been present in the emergency lane, it was most likely that the 
Ostler pick-up would have roll ed unharmed into a field. 
2 At one point cou nse t tor the de tense raises a ques tion about the qualitica tions ot Mr. Hulbert to 
testify on the matter o t the so-ca lled "mo th-phenomenon;" however , it is clear trom the 
transcript ot the tri al that any alleged lack ot experti se had nothing to do with the trial judge's 
decision to reject the evide nce (Transcript ot Trial, p. 245). 
3 I have regrouped the sub-points under I according to their log ica l connection s_ 
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In all Ihree cases the evidence was rejected on the grounds that it 
would not be helpful to the jury, because it was not clear whether fath e. 
Ostler was awake or asleep . Taking each point in iso lation, might give 
this a reasonable appearance; however, taking them in isolat ion overlook 
the fact that Ostler is trying to present a larger argument, which will bf 
explained below, and th at Ostler also proposed introducing ev idence to 
support the claim that father Ostler was awake, but drowsy, at the time 
of the accident. 
2. Was father Ostler awake? 
The next pieces of evidence rejected by the trial court concern 
whether or not father Ostler was awake; if the appropriateness of th e 
moth phenomenon, Wheeler's failure to place emergency devices and the 
pert inence of the re-created accident are all dependent on the answer to 
the question whether father Ostler was awake, it would seem reasonabl e 
to allow th e jury to deliberate on the evidence relating to this matter. 
However, the trial court ruled that because the evidence was not decisiv 
(or conclusive) it was inappropriate. 
Ostler cites Rule 104(b) and interpretations of it to support his 
claim that this rul ing was based on a misinterpretation of the law. As a 
legal layman, it seems to me that the case is this: Rule 104(b) says tha . 
if the evidence strong enough to give prima facie su pport to a judgment 
that someth ing is or is not the case, the trial court should allow the jUfl 
to hear that evidence and reach its own decision. In the case at hand, th( 
trial court denied the jury access to the evidence on the grounds that thE. 
evidence was not conc lu sive . It strikes me that if indeed this were the 
standard, there would be precious little for a jury eve r to deliberate; all 
the evidence tlley would ever be given would be such that "no reasonable 
mind could disagree" and one might suppose all juries would ever hear 
would be directed verdicts . 
The Court of Appeals gives no sign of having appreciated the logic ' 
Ostler's point here in denying the appea l. In its decision the Court of 
Appeals gives little attention to thi s part of the appeal. What atte ntion 
Affidavit of Patricia Hanna Page 7 
does give fa lls victim to the same mistake made by the trial court, say ing 
only that "Plaintiff' s own expert admitted that there was no conclusive 
way to determine Stephen Ostler's state of consciousness prior to the 
accident" (Opin ion, p. 4). In light of Ostler's point, this statement is 
simply beside the point and seems to be completely out of context. 
3, Wheeler's violation of the 10- 15- and 70- hour rules 
Ostler attempted to introduce evidence showing that Wheeler was in 
violation of several federal regulations governing interstate truck 
drivers; in the case at hand, the point of this evidence was to show that 
Wheeler was exhausted at the time he stopped in the emergency lane. The 
relevance of Wheeler's exhaustion is two-fold. One, it contributes to his 
negligence; the decision to rule it out because neg ligence was not 
relevant, having been determined in a directed verdict, is reasonable. 
However, it also relates to the issues of proximate cause and liability. 
Exhaustion contributes to an exercise of poor judgment; given Wheeler's 
position and responsibilities, evidence that he was exhausted would 
affect whether and to what extent he should be held li able. Further, if 
Wheeler stopped in the emergency lane because he was exhausted and 
needed to urinate as a consequence of drinking too much coffee in an 
attempt to stay awake , this would have a bearing on his culpability. The 
Court of Appeals comments only that th is (like all the other issues) "goes 
to the issue of Wheeler's negligence, a matter previously decided by 
directed verdict, and may be excluded as irrelevant. ~ Utah R. Evid . 402 
("evidence which is not relevant is not admiss ible. ")" (Opinion, p. 6). 
4. The ourpose of the emergency lane foreseeability of oossibility of 
such an incident in designing highways and Wheeler's foreseen such a 
possib il ity 
Ostler tried to introduce expert testimony relating to these issues 
to show that, as an interstatp truck drive r Wheeler was 1) aware of the 
intended use of emergency lanes, 2) instructed not to use them unless 
there was a bona fide emergency because of their intended function (to 
provide a buffer zone for straying vehicles to make corrections within, 
showing that it was foreseen by highway designers that vehicles would 
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occasionally leave the road surface and st ray into the emergency lane), 
and 3) capable himself of foreseeing that such a thing might happen. 
Insofar as foreseeability is rel evant to proximate cause, this 
evidence clear ly is related to that iss ue. It was disallowed on the grour 
that it only related to negligence, and that all these matters were 
"common knowledge." The Cou rt of Appea ls upheld th e trial court' s rul in 
This is a mistake on two grounds, 1) because it fai ls to take account of 
the fact that one circumstance may relate to mo re than one issue,in thi, 
case the circumstances are relevant !2Q1b. to negligence arui to proximat! 
cause; and 2) because Ostler argues that these issues are not common 
knowledge. 
Admissibility of th is evidence 
Ostl er argues that all this evidence was relevant to th e case and 
should have been admitted . In order to see that th is is so, one needs to 
understand the argument which Ostler offers to the Court of Appea ls in 
order to support his contention that Wheeler was negligent, one of the 
proximate causes of his inju ry and, therefore, liable . 
Th is type of argument is called a constructive d ilem ma; it IS a w ' 
understood and valid form of argument4 
1. Either father Ostler was awake or asleep at the time of the 
accident. 
2. If he was awake, then Wheeler's truck exerted a lu ring effect or 
him, causing him to vee r off th e road; in the absence of flashers or 
tr iangles, Wheeler's truck was one of the proximate causes of th e 
acciden t (fathe r Ostler's driv ing itse lf be ing the other), and Wheeler IS 
therefore liab le for the accident. 
4 According 10 Wi ll iam Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Developmenl of Loaic (London: 196~ 
di temma has been recognized as a valid mode of arg umentation since the second century A.D .. 
when il appears in the writing s of Hermogenes (p. 178). 
• 
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3. tf, on the other hand, father Ostler was asleep, th en while there 
was no luring effect, Wheeler's truck parked in the emergency lane 
without flashers or triangles st ill remains as one of the proximate causes 
of the accident. Had the truck not been there, there would have been no 
accident. Again, Wheeler is liable as one of the proximate causes. 
4. Therefore, regardle ss of whether father Ostler was awake or 
asleep, Wheeler's parking his truck in the emerg ency lane stands as a 
proximate cause of the accident, and consequen tly Wheeler is at least 
partially liable for the accidentS 
To argue that taken piece-by -piece the evidence would not be helpful 
to the jury and to exclude it on that ground is prejudicial since it 
prevented Ostler's constructing this argument; furthe r,to argue that each 
piece of evide nce is disallowed because it relates to negligence and 
negligence is not an issue, is to take too narrow a view of the nature of 
events. Many features of the world are relevant to different aspects of 
our lives. For· example, the fact that th e sky is blue is surely rel evant 
(pertains) to th e artist trying to paint a landscape, but this does not make 
it irrelevant to the astronomer trying 
atmosphere and light's reaction to it. 
to explai n the nature of our 
So too, the fact that all the 
evidence had a bearing on negligence did not ipso facto render it 
ineligible for considerat ion by the jury in connection with the issue of 
proximate cause. This is especially so given the fact that the issue of 
proximate cause was the key to the decision. The Court of Appeals' 
decision shows absolutely no appreciation of thi s fact, and In no sense 
addresses it. Indeed the already quoted passage on p. 6 of the Opinion 
clearly demonstrates thi s. 
5 A similar argument can be conslructed to show that whether father Ostler was awake or 
asleep, emergency devices would have most likely avoided the accident. Had the emergency 
devices been in place, then if father Ostler was asleep, running over the triangles would most 
likely have awakened him, thus avoiding the accident; Ilad he not been asleep, the devices would 
have alerted him to the truck and allowed Il im to avoid at the accident. With the devices, the 
accident would have been avoidable; tllerefore, whether father Ostler is awake or asleep at the 
time of the accident, the truck without emergency devices in place, is one of the proximate 
causes of tile acciden t. 
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Further, in several instances the evidence was rul ed out on the 
grounds that th e jury a lready knew everything being di scussed: afterall, 
they had driven of interstate highways , driven at night, etc. Ostler 
presents strong evidence that under one , and perhaps th e most relevant, 
s tandard of admiss ibili ty of expert testimony, the tria l judge misapp liec 
th e law and held Ostler' s witn esses to too high a standard. The Court of 
Appeals s imply endorses th e trial court's ruling, and had no discuss ion 0 ' 
Ostler 's arg umen ts against th is decision . 
The common law standard allows expert testimony to be excluded ' 
it concerns informatio n which in within the common knowledge of the 
JUry. Under this standard, since we all can understand the use of 
emergency lanes (and no doubt at one time read a description of them) an 
si nce we can understand the "moth phenomenon" and no doubt relate it to 
personal experiences, there is no need for experts to tell us about them. 
However, under Ru le 702 which supersedes the common law standard, thi . 
requirement is relaxed. It is no"" no longer necessary to show th at the 
expert knows something that the jury doesn 't know, a ll that is necessary 
is that the expert be able to make th e facts perspicuous to the jury and 
that the expert's testimony not prejudge the case. 
Rule 702 states 
If scientif ic, technical or other specialized 
knowledge wil l assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witne ss qualified as an expert 
by know ledge, skill, expe rience, training or 
education may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise . (Emphasis added.) 
Under Rul e 702, an expert can be employed if 
his testimony will be helpful to the trier of 
fact in understand ing evidence that is simp ly 
difficu l t [though) not beyond ordinary 
understand ing. 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3rd 
Cir . 1985) (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 18) . 
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In the case at hand, Ostler argues th at the jury was fully capable of 
understanding all the excluded evidence , but that it was essential to have 
that evidence placed clearly before them. Specifically: 1) Members of 
the jury may all have been sleepy drivers at one time, but this does not 
entail that they all know about the moth phenomenon or how it operates so 
as to cause a merely sleepy driver to leave the road in a fashion one might 
think possible only for dr iver who was in fact asleep. 2) Th ere is no 
reason to suppose that the ju rors knew about the different reactions 
caused in a sleepy driver by steady tail-lights, blinking tail-lights, and 
flares; or how these reactions can affect the outcome in a situation like 
that at issue. 3) It is unclear that the average driver actually 
understands the intended function of an emergency lane (indeed causal 
observation might indicate that it is perfectly clear that they do not). 4) 
Nor is there any antecedent reason to think that the average juror has the 
sligh test idea that interstate truckers are held, by federal regulation, to 
significantly high er standard s th an are ordinary drivers. 
In the present case of most of the evidence at hand , not only did the 
Jury need to have it made clear (as Rule 702 allows), but it is 
overwhelmingly likely that they needed simply to be make aware of it (as 
the higher common law standard requires). Not knowing these facts has a 
clear impact on the decision concerning foreseeability on Wheeler's part, 
and on a judgment of Wheeler's liabi lity. 
Yet the tria l judge disallowed this testimony all on the grounds that 
no expertise was needed to understand it. The Court of Appeals argues 
that in the absence of proof on Ostler's part that this omission was 
substantive an prejudicial, it can see no basis of overturning the trial 
judge's ruling. It is admitted by all parties that the trial judge has wide 
discretion in such matters; and that to overrule .the trial judge's decision 
without exceptional evidence for doing so would defeat the purpose of thi s 
discretion. 
However, this line of reasoning can be carried too far; in Ostler' s 
case it led to a failure on the part of the Court of Appeals to comprehend 
the nature of the damage exclusion of the evidence did to Ostler's ca se. 
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The Cou rt of Appeals sees only one form which an exceptional case could 
take: each and every piece of ev idence taken in isolation wo uld by itself 
make or break the case. However, as indicated above , Ostler's argument is 
not an atomistic one; it is an organic or cumulative argument. In denying 
Ostler's evidence, the Court denied Ostler the chance to tell h is side of th 
story, and consequently denied the jury a viable alternative upon which to 
make an essentially comparative judgment. 
Since no one knew whether father Ostler was awake or asleep, or 
whether or not Wheeler was exhausted and functioning below the minimur 
standard to which he is held, the jury had to make a "best case" call with 
only one case available. In short, the jury was to make a comparative 
ruling when the available alternatives consist of only Q..!}&. case (comparin ~ 
A to nothing). In such a case, all the jury had to go on in reaching its 
decision was whether Wheeler'S story made sense; since they had no 
alternative account of the s ituation , they could not compare that story 
w ith another sensible story to see if one was a better account of what 
happened. Having concluded that Wheeler'S story was coherent, as it is, 
the jury had no alternative but to rule against Ostler. If they had been 
allowed access to Ostler's evidence, in virtue of the form of the new 
deliberation (comparing A to B, whe re A and B are two different 
scenarios), the decision drawn might have been different. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision that Ostler does not prove 
a substantive and prejudicial error is incorrect; it seems to me to show a 
failure to read the. briefs carefully . 
Point II and Point III 
Rpstricted cross-examination of Wheeler concernlnO search for a place to 
\lrinate 
Wheeler's violation of federa l reaulations (10-, 15-, and 70- hour rules) 
was intended to offer evidence of impeachment by bad act 
Both concern Ostler's attempt to impeach Wheeler's testimony. The 
trial judge disallowed the lines of questioning on the ground that it 
related only to negligence and negligence was irrelevant. Ostler'S claim i 
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that thi s IS a mistake because they relate to proximate cause and 
liability_ The Co urt of Appeals offers nothing new on this, falling back 
once again on the stand that if an issue is related to negligence, it is 
appropriately excluded_ There is no evidence that the Court of Appeal s 
appreciates this argument for the dual nature of the te st imony_ 
Po int IV 
Mi sstatements du ri no closi no defendant's closino statement 
In closing remarks, the defendant's counsel stated that the iss ue 
was not whether Wheeler could have foreseen that a drive r might at some 
time run off the road into the emergency lane, but whether he could have 
foreseen that Ostler (or someone else) would have runoff the road into his 
truck at just that time _ 
[T]he foreseeability question is: How was Stan 
Whee ler expected to foresee that at that precise 
time, if as Mr_ Oe8ry said, one in a bi llion chances 
that it would happen right at that particular time--
(Ouoted in Op inion, p_ 8)_ 
Th is clearly is not the standard to foreseeability ; if it were, no one would 
ever be able to fo resee any thing_ 
Ostler objected, and the only response of the trial judge was to 
direct the juror's to their inst ructions_ He did not rule on the objection, 
clearly leaving the misstatement u nco rrected _ In some cases this might 
have caused no harm; however in the case at hand, Ostler argues that it 
causes harm_ The problem with simply directing the jurors's attention to 
the instructions is that the instructions themselves are unclear, 
complicated and difficult to understand_ Th is will be discussed in more 
detail under Point X below_ 
In the Court of Appeals' ruling, this objection is treated together 
with Point V_ The Court of Appeals notes that th e jury was directed to its 
instructions , and says that taken in context, the remark caused no harm _ 
This decision and the reasoni ng beh ind it reflects the Court of Appea ls' 
fai lure to take the misstatement and its correct ion in context, viz_ the 
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larger context of the legal iss ues involved in the jury's deliberations an, 
the fact that their in structions on these matters we re unclear and 
confusing. 
Po int V 
Who Pays 
This IS related to Point IV since it concerns another misleading 
statement made during closing. Here there is on ly an implication that tt-. 
defendants would have to payout of their own pockets; hence it is less 
clearly misleading than in the case of Point IV where the misinformatio l 
was clearly stated . The Court of Appeals ' ruling on this point seems we 
taken; unfortunately because Point IV was treated in conjunction with 
this, the ruling on Point V seems to have been misapplied to Point IV. 
Point VII 
Jury given incorrect instructions on Wheeler's duty to set out flares Qr 
triangles 
Wheeler admitted that he didn't set out the emergency devices; I.C . 
regulations requ iring that they be set out were read tQ Jury. 
Whenever a vehicle is stQpped upon the shoulder of 
a highway from any cause Qther than necessary 
traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible, 
but in any even within 10 minutes, place warning 
devices [f lares or reflective triangles] ( I. C.C. rule, 
quoted in Appeal, p. 41). 
Therefore , it is clear that Wheele r had a duty to set out the 
devices. However, th e jury was clearly instructed that this was not so. 
Instead they were told that the regUlations required that the devices be 
set out only if th e driver was parked for 10 minutes or longer QL if parkl 
less than 10 minutes, depending on circumstances. 
However if you find that defendant Wheeler wa s 
parked for less than 10 minutes, it is for you to 
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determine whether or not Wheel er should 
neverthe less have set out the flares or triangles 
under the ex isting circumstances (appeal p. 42). 
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This clearly states that whether a truck driver has to set out the 
emergency devices when stopped for less than 10 minutes is up to the 
driver's judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that this instruction, even 
i1. substantially incorrect, did not do any harm because it relate s only to 
negligence. Again the Court of Appeals misunderstands Ostler's appeal. 
Ostle r's point is that the I.C.C. regulation makes it clear that 
truckers are held to higher standards than are ordinary drivers, e.g., 
putting on the truck's blinkers is simply not enough; therefore, even if the 
judge's interpretation of the rule as it applied in the present case were 
correct (viz., that truckers have leeway in deciding when they need to 
place emergency devices out when they are stopped), failure to make the 
actual rul e clear was prejudicial against Ostler since it allowed Wheeler 
to be judged by the lower standards of safety applicable to ordinary 
drivers. 
Further, it is not to the point to say that fa ilure to set out warning 
devices is related to negligence; of course it is. The point, once again, is 
that it is also related to proximate cause; on that ground it should have 
been stated clearly and correctly. It does not help the Court of Appeals' 
judgment to point out that earlier in the instructions, the I.C.C. regulation 
was stated correctly. In view of the misstatement, the jury was simply 
left with two conflicting state ments, both dealing with w highly relevant 
matter, and no direction on how to resolve that conflict. 
Point I X 
Video taoe demonsiration 
A video was prepared by an expert witness to help the jury decide 
the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause. Since 
these decisions require jurors to decide what would have happened if the 
"cause" (Wheele r' s truck's being parked in the emergency lane) had not 
been there, it is apparent that the jurors are asked to determine the truth 
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of a counterfactual (a "con tra ry to th e facts" or a "what if" case). The 
idea is to see what was contributed to th e s ituation by the negligent ac t; 
one asks, "but for [the parked truck] what would have tran sp ired?" or 
"what if the truck hadn 't been there; what would have happened then?" 
Such determinations are notoriously difficult; therefore, it is hard to see 
how a v ideo showing a scene very much like what seems likely to have 
obta ined at th e time of the accide nt, but without th e truck in the 
emergency lane, cou ld have been anything but helpful. 
The trial cou rt disallowed the video on two grounds. First, that the 
video did not meet the requirements of a re-enac tment; it was not simila 
enough to the incident to co unt as a re-enactment. Second, th at it was 
just "specu lat ion" ( Opinion , p. 5), and as such would not help the jury . 
The s'econd is either misguided , or if not misgu ided then such as to 
call fo r a through-going revi sion of leg al standards. In deciding these 
issues one has no option other than to engage in "speculation;" had the 
truck in fact not been then:; , th ere would be facts to cons ider , but then 
the re would be no case requiring a decision. If the reason for disallowing 
the video is jury confusion, then again it seems that one will no longer be 
allowed to ask juries to make this sort of determination since it is the 
dete rmination itself, not the video, that is confusing. 
Therefore, everything rests on th e first ground; and this is in fact 
the ground most d iscussed by th e Court of Appeals. Here Ostler argues 
that the s tandard of similarity applies only to re-enactm ents, where an 
attempt is made to come as close as poss ible to du plicating the actua l 
acc iden t. In such a cas e, similarity wou ld be very relevant and shou ld be 
taken very seriously. Howeve r, this was not the in tention in this case. 
Here it is apparent and unargued that the v ideo depicted a scene that coulC 
DQl have occurred on the nig ht father Ostle r ran into Wh eele r's truck; the 
point of the v id eo is .illu strat ive, to aid the jury in reaching a decision on 
the issue of proximate cause. 
In ruling on the appeal , the Court of Appeals applied a three-prong 
test: relevance, similarity and non-co nfusing. It decided that the v id eo 
failed the first two. It th en co nsidered the argu ment that th e v ideo was 
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not a re-enactment, but an illustration; 
on the ground that Ostler did not show 
and upheld the tria l court's ruling 
that disallowing it did any harm or 
th at the trial court abused its discret ion. 
Once again, the Court of Appeals misses the po int. The very nature 
of decision of proximate cause and supersed ing intervening causes is by 
its nature confusing. In view of the vast body of evidence already denied 
th e jury for its de libe rations, it is difficult to make a case for the claim 
that showing them th e video woule! be confusing. At th is stage of the trial 
the video tape was the only hope Ostler had of making th e point that 
Wheeler's truck was not simply somethino for father Ostler's truck to hit 
(as though he would have hit somethi ng else or rolled over if it hadn't been 
th ere) , but that but for Wheeler's truck there would have been no accident 
of the sort that occurred. The video makes the point that Ostler's injuries 
are not causally overdetermined,6 but that Wheeler's truck is a necessary 
causal factor. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals fail to see 
this point. 
Point X 
Couri's instructions on intervening causes was incorreci. 
Ostler objected on several points: 
1. "In tervening independent cause " was undefined. 
2. Foreseeability was not the only test of causat ion 
3. Precise accident rather than general sort of accident was held to 
be the standa rd of foreseeability. 
4. The in structions were confus ing . 
6 If something is causa lly overdetermined, it wi ll occur whelher or not one of the causes 
occurs. For example, if I have taken an overdoes of sleeping pills and alter I take them you 
fatally shoot me, we can say Ihat my deatll was causally overdetermined. Keeping the shooting 
constant, even if I don't take the pills, I die; keeping the pills constant, even if you don't shoot 
me, I die. 
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The Court of Appeals denied the appeal on the ground that the 
corrections would have been more confusing than the instructions as 
given, that the contested instructions concern negligence and were 
th erefo re harmless because irrelevant, and that Ostler offers no proof 
that the in struct ions resulted in a substantive and prejudicial opinion. 
Th is decision one aga in fails to take account of dual nature of SOfT 
of the evidence, as well as failing to take account of the context in whi, 
the instructions were given and the evidence availabl~ to the jury. The 
jury was to make a decision on an issue without being allowed to hear 
Ostler's side of the issue (see Point I). Taken in this context, Ostler's 
case that it is overwhelmingly likely that the jury's ultimate decision 
was influenced adversely by these confusing and misleading instructior 
is much stronger than the Court of Appeals ' reasoning indicates. 
Point XI 
Directed verdict on causation 
Perhaps the main thrust of this appeal is that the jury was asked 
del iberate and decide on an issue, proximate cause, on which they were 
given none of Ostler's evidence and on which the instructions from the 
Judge were unclear and confusing. In view of this it seems at least 
unreasonable to ask the jury to reach a decision on the matter; however 
the case at hand the error runs even deeper. 
Ostler asked for a directed verdict on causation on the grounds th , 
the trial court's earlier directed verdict on negligence implied a simi la ' 
verdict on causation. The defendant's respon se claims that if this were 
allowed to stand, it would be tantamount to equating negligence and 
causat ion; this is simply not so. Ostler argues only that in this case is 
the re an implication from neg lig ence to causation; this does not imply 
that there is such an implication 1fT every case. 
For example, I might park negligently with respect to the wild 
anima ls in Yellowstone but not be a proximate cause of your running int 
my car and causing yourself serious injury, if, for example, I am parked 
~ 
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nex t to a 300 ft. drop-off which you would have plummeted over in any 
case. The case at hand is not of this sort. Here the negligence implies 
causation. This is shown by ask ing Yill..a1 it was that made the act of 
parking in the emergency lane neg ligent. Th e answer is two-fo ld: 1) risk 
to a class of persons which included Ostler and 2) subjecting Ostler to 
the hazard which lead to his injury (Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 60). 
Thus, causation is implied by neg ligence. 
The rea lization of the hazard was brought about by father Ostler's 
driving, but that does not negate the fact that Wheeler's parking in the 
emergency lane is a proximate cause of that Injury. The standards cited 
by Ostler clearly support this co ntention 7 
Ostler goes on to argue that in thi s case the standard for a directed 
verdict is met: reasonable minds cannot disagree. They cannot disagree 
because the answer follows by definitio n from the earlier verdict. In the 
Appellant's Substitute Brief, p. 62, Ostler makes this clear: "The fact 
that reasonable minds could not differ on proximate cause is illustrated 
by th e following question: What ri sks of harm (other than accidents with 
passing motorists) could make Wheeler's parking negligent? None are 
apparent." Unfortunately, this is not to say that they will not disagree; 
otherwise, we would all be A students in mathematics and logic. If we 
are ill-informed, confused or misled we may well fail to agree even 
though we are reasonable 
The present case is of this unfortunate sort. The jurors were led to 
draw the wrong conclus ion not because it was an open question, but 
because they were not given the facts which would have led them to draw 
th e correct conclusion. They were neither allowed to judge the issue of 
causation as a simpl e matter of fact, because they were denied access the 
relevant evidence (see Points I, II, III , VII, and IX) nor was it made clear to 
them that as a matter of logic the case was closed. 
7 The illustrative cases in Restatement o f Torts, 2d, 442 A and B, 447 and 449 are especially 
clear and illuminating on the issue a t hand. (See Reply Brief, Appendix 3 and pp. 42-44. ) 
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The Court of Appeals' grounds for th eir decision to reject the appea l 
are confusing. First it is stated that generally proximate causation is 
taken to be a determination of fact to be made by the jury. This may be 
true in gene ral : but Ostler has argued that it is not true in thi s case. 
Moreove r, even if it were true, the jury had already been denied access to 
relevant evidence and could not make the determination . The Court of 
Appeals' decision does not address this argum ent. 
Second the Court of Appeals states that ''' proximate cause ' is one of 
the essential elements of a negligence action" (Op inion, p. 10). This 
implies that without proximate causation, one cannot find negligence. 
But, this supports Ostler's claim, and cannot, therefore, count as a reason 
for denying that appeal. It is perfectly opaque why the Court of Appeals 
makes this citation. What follows on p. 10 of the Opinion is equally 
unmotivated. It seems correct, but neither adds to nor contrad icts any of 
Ostler's arguments or contentions . In short , th e entire section on p. 10 
stands as an enigma in the Court of Appeals' reasoning . 
Conclusions 
As already stated, it is difiicult to understand how this Opinion 
could have been endorsed by three judg es. I can only conclude that in 
reach ing its dec ision, the Court of Appeals failed to take in to account 
many important aspects of the arg uments made in the appeal : at several 
points the Court of Appeals' argumentation is beside the point and fa il s to 
address the arguments made in the appeal. Due to time pressures or 
misunderstandings, a single individual might fa il to grasp the poi nts at 
issue and the structure of the plaintiff's arguments: however, it seems 
highly unlikely that three individuals cou ld al l have made th e same errors 
in analys is. I can only conclude that the Opinion was the product of a 
sing le judge (Bench), and that th e other two judges signed it without 
g iving the briefs the careful and detailed reading and analysis which they 
deserved and requ ired. 
Affidavit o f Patrici a Ha nna -
DATED this Q/Vi day of 
Page 21 ) 
, 1989. 
C-- ) /L 
By : i7-7l.A-77C~ 
PATRIC IA HANNA 
~!;SCribed and 'Jsr sworn to before me this ,;z day of 
, ,.k·, 1989. 
~l 
APPENDIX 5 
M. Dayle Jeffs, ItG 1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
i 
\ 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
\ 
" 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO. , INC . 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STM-H_EY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants 
MOTION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS 
AGAINST ROBERT J. DEBRY 
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNSEL 
FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
I · RALPH OSTLER 
Court of Appeals No.: 
880-0228-CA 
COMES NOW the defendants/respondents, Albina Transfer Co., Inc. , F & R 
Roe, Inc., and Stanley E. Wheeler, by and through counsel M. Dayle Jeffs, and hereby move 
the Court to impose sanctions against attorney Robert J. DeEry in his capacity as counsel to 
plaintiff/appellant, Ralph Ostler, for all pleadings filed after the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in favo r of said defendants on September 8, 1989, as such sanctions are proper under 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Utah Code Ann . §78-27-56 (1989), and for attorneys fees and costs incurred by 
defendants/respondents in responding to such pleadings. Sanctions to be awarded herein in 
r:f~r_ 
I 
I 
t 
'. ': . 
accordance with the memorandum in support of this motion, and the exhibits attached thereto 
and by reference made a part hereof. 
d 
Dated and signed thisE day of April, 1991. 
C\_ p?~ ?WAJ~~ M. Dayle Jeff 
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M. Dayle Jeffs, ItGl655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
( 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
v . 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
ST ANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Court of Appeals No.: 
880-0228-CA 
I hereby certify that the original of Motion to IMpose Sanctions on Robert J. 
DeBry in his capacity as Counsel for Ralph Ostler and Memorandum in Support of this Motion 
was hand delivered to the Clerk of the Court, Utah Court of Appeals and a copy to the below 
named party by hand delivery, this date, April 12, 1991, to the following address: 
Robert J. DeBry 
DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Murray, Utah 84107 
G-~ -%t IJ~ ./ 
M. Dayle Je~~ 
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ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
~252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
, 
\ 
JUN ') ::. 1991 
:.*:."'\ry T r '~Oc ;'i~n 
C i ~r~: ~~ n'; ! Cc~rt 
L·.~.'; C .... \ :. : r~ G: P'::.-..:ct.ds 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
~.LPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
ST~~LEY E. WrlEELER, 
Defendants. 
) 
) MEMO~~DUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
) PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST 
) ROBERT J. DEBRY AS COUNSEL FOR 
) P~.INTIFF R~LPH OSTLER 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: 910246 - CA 
) 
) 
---------------------------)---------------------------
~.RGUMENT 
Plaintiff' relies upon the aff idavits of Carl S. Hawkins 
(Exhibit A) and Samuel D. Thurman (Exhibit B). 
D~.TED this 2 1 day of June, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
A~tornev for Plaintiff 
"/ // 
,/ /1 ,_/ /J~( ,,' / 
By: r~" /H ,;;; .J?! Df -r 
ROBERT J. DEERY 
'For ease of reaQlng and to avoid misunderstanding, this motion 
will adopt the heading and nomenclature of Mr. Jeffs' petition. 
However , as a technical matter, Albina is neither a defendant nor 
a respondent herein; rather, Albina is the petitioner. Further-
more , Ostler is not the plaintiff hereini rather, Ostler is the 
nominal respondent herein. 
f ~~ ~ r-. ~ .  -. , . 
. :-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Y.EMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR S~~CTI ON S 
AG.l>.INST ROBERT J . DEBRY ;'.S COUNSEL FOR PT .b.INTTFF RF.LPH OSTLER ,. 
"9 / .'el 
was mailed, postage prepaid , this';:; -(Ostler v . Albina, et al.) 
day of June, 1991 , to the following: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 Nor th 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
0566 - 159\jn 
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ROBERT J. DEERY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
--,.\ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL D. THURY~ 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: 910246-CA 
) 
-----------------------------)----------------------------
STATE OF UTAH 
ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
My name is Samuel D. Thurman. 
statements under oath: 
I make the following 
1. I am presently on the faculty of Law at the 
University of California , Hastings College of Law, San Francisco. 
This is my curriculum Vitae: 
Co-author the Legal Profession, Thurman, Phillips and 
Cheatham (Foundation Press) widely adopted in law schools across 
the country. 
Articles on legal ethics in law reviews and other legal 
publications. 
Member, American Bar Association conunission on Evaluation 
of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission). Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct drafted by this commission and adopted in most 
states, including Utah. 
Who's Who in America. 
Who's Who in the World. 
Who's Who in American Law. 
, 
, 
Head of the three national law school accreditation 
organizations (President, Association of American Law Schools; 
President, National Order of the Coif; Chairman, A.B.A. Council of 
the section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar) . 
Degrees: A.B. University of Utah , Phi Beta Kappa, High 
Honors; J. D. Stanford Law School, Order of the Coif; L. L. D. , 
Uni v ersity of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; International 
University, California Western School of Law; University of Utah. 
Teaching subj ects: Legal Profess ion, Torts, Consti tu-
tional Law, Evidence. 
Taught at : Utah, Stanford, Pepperdine, Texas, Louisiana 
State, New York University, Michigan, and University of California, 
Hastings College of Law (currently as a member of the 65 Club). 
Associate and Acting Dean, Stanford Law School. 
Dean , University of Utah College of Law . 
Distinguished Professor , Utah. 
Samuel D. Thurman Professorship established at Utah . 
Holder of Marion Rice Ki r kwood Professorship at Stanford. 
Justice Hugo Black Lecturer, University of Alabama. 
Recipient of the 1990 Robert J. Kutak Professional 
Responsibility Award from the American Bar Association. 
American Law Institute Life Member. 
Fellow, F~erican Bar Foundation . 
Board of Directors, National Legal Services Corporation 
(Presidential Appointment) . 
Board of Directors , California Law Revision commission. 
Adviser, Restatement of Torts, Second. 
Editorial Board, Foundation Press, University Casebook 
Series (the largest publisher of law school course books) . 
2 
Member, Council on Legal Education for Professional 
Responsibility (CLEPR). 
2. I have been asked to render an opinion as to whether 
Robert J. DeBry acted ethically and in good faith in submitting an 
affidavit by Professor Patricia Hanna in the Ostler personal injury 
case (781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989)). Although a cogent argument 
can be made that the trial court in Ostler was clearly in error in 
refusing to direct a verdict against defendant on the issue of 
legal (proximate) cause, that is not the primary issue before this 
Court at the present time . This Court is asked to determine 
whether Mr. DeBry engaged in unprofessional conduct in filing with 
the Utah Court of Appeals an affidavit in connection with a 
Petition for Rehearing in Ostler. 
3. The affidavit in question was that of Dr. Patricia 
Hanna, Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Utah . 
Although Dr. Hanna is not a lawyer there can be little question as 
to her expertise in the field of logic and causation. Nor can 
there be much doubt that the primary issue in Ostler was legal 
cause, one of the most misunderstood concepts in the law , 
involving, as it does, complex interrelations between causation and 
public policy. It is a subject that continues to baffle the best 
minds . Dr. Hanna's affidavit was clearly directed to the subject 
of causation, her field of expertise . 
4. The major thrust of plaintiff's original personal 
injury cause of action was statutory negligence based upon the 
acknowledged violation of Sec. 41-6-103 (1) (i) Utah Code Ann., 
prohibi ting the stopping of a vehicle on a controlled access 
highway. Violations of criminal statutes are generally found to be 
negligence per se in a tort action if (1) the statute is a safety 
measure, (2) the injury stems from the kind of accident foreseen by 
the legislature, and (3) the party injured was in a class sought to 
be protected by the legislature . (Restatement of Torts, Second, 
Sec. 286.) If all three criteria are found , as they must be in 
this case, negligence should be found, usually Der se. 
(Restatement of Torts, Second, Sec. 288B.) The trial court in 
Ostler so directed the jury. 
5. Turning next to proximate (legal ) cause, the first 
requirement, that of actual cause (substantial factor), is clearly 
met in Ostler and the question of whether legal cause is present 
depends upon a judicial determination of whether there are policy 
reasons to limit the liability of a negligent defendant whose 
negligence is an actual cause of plaintiff's injury. (Restatement 
of Torts, Second, Sec. 431.) In Ostler there appear to be no such 
policy reasons. Instead , it is a rare case where the three 
3 
criteria referred to in the preceding paragraph are found by a 
court to exist and where proximate cause is not found. In Ostler , 
proximate cause should have been directed by the trial court . 
6. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that con-
clusion, Mr. DeBry, as a careful lalo.'Yer, could have reasonably 
believed that a directed verdict on legal cause was justified and 
that he had good reason to focus his Petition for Rehearing on that 
i ssue . As a part of that Petition, the filing of an affidav it by 
an expert in causation cannot be deemed unprofessional conduct, 
even if that expert is a non - lawyer. In the landmark case of Brown 
v. Board of Educati on of Topeka , 3~7 u .s. 483 ( 1954 ) , the United 
states Supreme Court. relied heavily upon the testimony of non-
lalo.'Yer professiona l s in reaching the conclusion that segregated 
public schools were inherently " unequal" and unconstitutional. I 
have no hesitancy in expressing my opinion that Mr . DeBry violated 
no ethical standards or duty of good faith in procuring and filing 
a non-lawyer affidavit in the Ost l er case. 
7 . Turning next to the question of the substance of Dr. 
Hanna's affidavit, many charges are made in defendant 's Petition 
for sanctions (pp. 4- 12) . Included in these charges a r e "frivolous 
appeal, " tlpurpose of delay, " Itbad faith," "without merit, " "no 
reasonable likelihood of success," "harass defendant ," " increase 
cost of litigation, " "acted unreasonably, " "criticism of thought 
processes of the court ," "motion filed without reasonable inquiry 
as to whether it is well grounded in fact or warranted by existing 
law or a good faith extension, modification , or reversal of 
existing law. " The Petition concludes: "Mr. DeBry ' s pleadings were 
without merit and were not brought in good faith as to their merit 
based on the objective standard." (p . 12.) 
8. I have read and studied with care the several br iefs 
in the Os t l er case, the Opinion of t h e Court of Appeals, the 
Petition for Rehearing ( including the Hanna affidavit ) and the 
Petit.ion for Sanctions. As a result of this study it is my opinion 
that the Hanna affidavit in no way justifies any of the charges 
made by defendant's counsel . Although Dr. Hann a ' s analysis of the 
case might be termed hyperbolic in places and her criticism severe, 
how many times have losing counsel complained that the court did 
not give their "briefs the careful and detailed analysis which they 
deserved and required?" Certainly such complaints have not been 
deemed sufficient to justify the imposition of attorney ' s fees on 
the attorney for the losing party. 
SaW'.'er, 
honest 
9. Justice Brennan , writing for the majority in In re 
360 u.s. 622, 635 (1959) stated : "The public attribution of 
error to the judiciary is no cause for professional 
4 
discipline in this country." Dr. Hanna's assertions that there 
must have been a "breakdown in the decision making process" and 
that the opinion in Ostler was "logically unsupportable " were 
statements less caustic than those held privileged in Sa.~er. 
10. Dr. Hanna's charges were central to the theme of her 
opinion which was submitted to a court having power to grant a 
rehearing. She had access to all of the underlying materials in 
the case and her opinion, covering 21 pages, was not rendered 
superficially . It was not disseminated to the public or to the 
press and was set forth in a scholarly, logical manner. It was not 
unprofessional or in bad faith for Mr. DeBry to procure and file 
such an affidavit. 
11 . Even if Dr. Hanna's analysis is deemed more critical 
than those customarily seen in legal proceedings, Mr. DeBry had an 
affirmative duty to zealously pursue his client ' s objectives. (See 
Preamble to Utah Rules of Professional Conduct: "As advocate, a 
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of 
the adversary system.") Especially in a Petition for Rehear ing, 
where the chances of success are usually remote, the attorney 
should be at liberty to utilize more imaginative procedures and 
advance more ingenious theories to justify reconsideration. Mr. 
DeBry took a chance , but not an unprofessional chance, in using an 
expert in logical analysis, a major component of proximate cause. 
Again, I conclude that Mr. DeBry's use of the non-lawyer affidavit 
in this case was consistent with, certainly not in violation of, 
his professional obligations. 
DATED this /x2l~ay of June, 1991. 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this ( :3 day of 
~~~~_~~~ _______ , 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
cz£:) -~ 
. NOTARY PUBLIC 
~RESIDING IN: ~~d· ~~~\~~' __ ~( ~tk~~ __ ~C£=c~~~~_ 
5 
JASON LA\'ffiSNC[: 
rTJ.. '1T' P!J3!J; • S .Ai : c! UTAH 
(32() SoU1h 700 Ezst <'3 
Sail W<E Cit,',U :ah &:107 
CO~;~M. 8:P, C-s-s~ 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER 
Plaint iff , 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO ., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
UTAH COUNTY 
My name is Carl S . Hawkins. 
under oath: 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
CARL S . HAWKINS 
Case No. 910246-CA 
I make the following statements 
1. I am a Professor of Law and former Dean of the J. Reuben 
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I have taught Torts 
for the las t eighteen years at B. Y.U . and for sixteen years before 
that at the University of Michigan Law School. I am a co - author of 
three editions of nationally-published casebooks on Torts and 
Advanced Torts, and I have published articles on Torts in several 
professional journals. I am a member of the bar of the District of 
Columbia, and of the states of Illinois, Michigan, and Utah 
(inactive status). 
2. At the request of Robert J. DeBry , I have read the opinion 
of the Utah Court of Appeals in the above case, and I have also 
read the briefs of the parties in order to form an opinion as to 
the nature of the Torts issues involved in this case as it stood 
when Plaintiff filed his Petition for Rehearing with the Court of 
Appeals. 
, 
; j 
, j 
t , 
1 
1 
! 
~ 
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3. This case involves, among other issues, fundamental 
questions of negligence theory, including the question of whether 
the scope of liability for violation of a particular legal rule 
should be determined by the court as a matter of legal policy, or 
whether that issue should be given to the jury, as if it were an 
issue of fact, under a "proximate cause " instruction. The Fourth 
District Court in this case did the latter. The opinion of the 
Court of Appeals obscures this basic legal question as to the scope 
of 1 iabil i ty by addressing it in terms of whether there ,"as 
intrinsic error in the trial court ' s inst~uction to the jury on 
independent, intervening cause (Instruction No. 27 ) . 
4. There is sUbstantial judicial and scholarly authority which 
holds that, before factual issues of causation are given to the 
jury in negligence cases, the court must determine as a matter of 
law whether the defendant owes a duty of reasonable Care to the 
plaintiff, and ",'hether the particular rule "'hich defendant 
allegedly violated was meant to guard against the particular risk 
of injury that plaintiff incurred. See, for example , D'Ambra v. 
United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.1. 1975 ) ; Hill v . Lundin & 
.".ssocia tes, Inc. , 256 So.2d 620 (La. 1972 ) ; Laird v. Travelers 
Insurance Co. , 267 So.2d 714 (La. 1972); Stoneburner v. Greyhound 
Corp., 375 P.2d 812 (Or. 1962) concurring opinion of Goodwin, J.; 
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty - Risk versus Proximate Cause, and the 
Rational Allocation of Functions Bet",een Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah 
L. Rev. 1; Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence La\''', 60 
Mich . L.Rev. 543 (1962); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 
61 Col. L. Rev. 14 01 (19 61). Under this analytical method, the 
issues in this case could be set forth in the follo",ing ",ay: 
(1) Does the driver of a truck and semitrailer on an 
Interstate high",ay owe a duty of reasonable care to other 
persons using the high",ay? 
(2) If so, does that duty require compliance with Utah Cod e 
Ann. Sec. 41-6-103, '.'hich prohibits the stopping of a v ehicle 
on a controlled access highway -- that is , was this statutory 
provision meant to guard against the risk of injury to a 
passenger in another vehicle that inadvertently ran into the 
rear of the parked vehicle? 
(3) Did defendant violate that duty? 
(4) Was there a substantial causal connection between 
defendant's conduct and plaintiff ' s injury? 
( 5) What damages resulted from plaintiff ' s injury and what 
proportion thereof wa s attributable to defendant's 
comparative negligence? 
5. Under this analytical method , questions (1) and (2) would 
be questions of law fo r the court in deciding the scope of 
defendant ' s legal duty and whether the rule invoked by the 
plaintiff prov i des protection against the kind of injury that 
occurred. This approach would not necessarily result in a decision 
in favor of the plaintiff. Even though the court would undoubtedly 
answer question (1) in the affirmative, it could conceivably make 
a negative decision on question (2) , taking responsibility for a 
clear legal decision that the statutory rule against stopping on a 
contr20lled access highway was not meant to protect passengers in 
another vehicle that ran into the rear of the parked truck . But 
when the issue is put in this way, the court might very well decide 
that the duty should cover such risks, in order to deter such 
collisions . Unless the following vehicle is intentionally or 
recklessly driven into the parked vehicle, the most effective way 
to reduce the incidence of such rear-end shoulder collisions would 
be to deter conscious decisions to park on the shoulder rather than 
trying to control the wider range of variables, both mechanical and 
human, that may cause other vehicles to drift inadvertently onto 
the shoulder. Plainti ff' s Petition for Rehearing (pp. 6-7), in 
effect, asked for such a legal determination by reference to 
Restatement of Torts (Second), sections 442 - 447. 
6. Question (3), the breach of duty or negligence issue, would 
usually be a fact i ssue for the jury, but in this case it was 
undisputed that defendant trucker had violated the statutory 
provision that prohibits stopping on the controlled access highway . 
Once this provision is construed as intended to prevent this kind 
o f rear-end collision, it follows that defendant's violation of the 
statute was negligence, as a matter of law. Restatement of Torts 
(Second) , Section 286. The trial judge recognized this by 
directing a verdict against defendant on the negligence issue . 
7. Question (4) , as to the causal connection between 
defendant's conduct and plaintiff ' s injury, 
issue for the jury, but in this case ' ~ 1.<.. 
plaintiff's injuries resulted from the 
might also be a 
vlas undisputed 
collision ,,'ith 
fact. 
that 
the 
semitrailer unit that defendant had parked in the "recovery lane" 
of the highway . Once the court has decided that the statutory rule 
which defendant violated was meant to guard against this kind of 
injury, the jury should not be invited to nullify that legal 
determination by importing questions of "proximate cause" and 
11 intervening cause ll into a causal relation instruction , when, in 
fact, the causal connection between defendant's negligent conduct 
and plaintiff's injury was beyond dispute. Thus, by this line of 
analysis, the trial court should have directed a verdict for 
plaintiff on the issue of causation as well as on the issue of 
defendant's negligence, as argued in Appellant ' s substitute Brief, 
pp . 59-65. The only issues left for jury submission would be 
disputed factual questions as to plaintiffs ' damages and the 
proportionate amount attributable to the truck driver I s comparative 
negligence. 
8. The suggestion , that the jury could have found that Stephen 
Ostler's inattentiveness "became the sole proximate cause of the 
collision" (781 P . 2d at 451), ,,'ould have no place under the 
analytical approach outlined above. It is undisputed that the 
physical obstacle against which plaintiff ' s vehicle collided was 
placed where it was by defendant 's negligent conduct. The notion 
~ 
\ 
that something else could be the "sole proximate cause " may be 
understood only in the context of an approach that asks the jury to 
decide , under the name of "proximate cause," the ultimate policy 
question as to the scope of legal liability for violation of the 
statute, even though defendant ' s negligent conduct was a cause of 
plaintiff ' s injury. 
9. For the purpose of the pending Petition For Sanctions, I 
assume it is not necessary to decide whether the trial court should 
have determined the scope 0: liability as suggested above, instead 
of giving that issue to the jury under an "intervening cau se" 
instruction t nor whether the case would have been decided 
differently if it had. It should only be necessary to determine 
1<lhether there was arguable merit in these Tort issues that 
Plaintiff ' s la;.'yer was trying t o raise by his Petition For 
Rehearing and whether such issues were raised by appropriate means. 
In my opinion, this case did raise fundamental questions of Tort 
law which the Petition For Rehearing was trying to bring to the 
Court of Appeals ' attention. 
10. I am famili ar with the affidavit by Samuel D. Thurman in 
which he gives his opinion (as an expert on legal ethics), 
including the following statement: 
"Even if Dr. Hanna's affidavit is deemed more critical than 
those customarily seen in legal proceedings , Mr. DeBry had an 
cffirmative duty to zealously pursue his clientls object.i.ves 
Especially in a Petition for Rehearing, where the chances 
o f success are usually remote, the attorney should be at 
liberty to utilize mo~e imaginative procedures and advance 
more ingenious theories to justify reconsideration." 
Mr. DeEry may have felt it necessary to resort to the "imaginative 
procedure" of filing Dr . Ha nna 's affidavit ;"ith his Petition :or 
Reconsideration, because 0: the way in which the Court of Appeals ' 
opinion (781 P.2d at 450-~51 ) had obscured the basic scope of 
.. 
liabil i ty i s sue s which he had tried to raise on appeal. I n my 
opinion , Dr . Hanna ' s criticism of the Court ' s analytical method 
tries to address , in non - legal terms , issues that would be 
recognized by respected legal authorities as serious questions of 
Tort law implicated in the Court ' s decision. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me the 
My commission expires 2>- &:" q.~r 
---""'--'--- --
BY~ 
Carl S . Ha,lkins 
'5;:z;? 
NOtary Public 
Residing in : "'" JI1i. l ... ,,- c.--'"~ 
JASON LAWRENCE 
ICTJJ!T 1'!.fU:. Sll7E d IJUJI 
C320 SoutI 7!X) East ::3 
Salt i..al;e City. Utllt 841 07 
COMM. EXP. 8-5-84 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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IN THE UT~~ COURT OF APPEP.LS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC . , and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Defendants. 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL GOLDSMITH 
) IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
) SANCTIONS AGAINST ROBERT J, 
) DEBRY IN HIS CAPACITY AS 
) COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF, RALPH 
) OSTLER 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: 910246-CA 
) 
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ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
My name is Michael Goldsmith. I give the follmdng 
testimony under oath: 
Introduction 
1, I am a p!"ofessor of law at the J. Rueben Clark La .. ' 
School, Brigham Young University, 
2. At the request of Robert J, DeBry, I have reviewed 
various materials concerning the motion for sanctions presently !. 
pending before this court. 
3. My opinion, based both on these materials and 
governing legal principles, is that the motion for sanctions is 
unwarranted. 
~ ·r .: ;:j ~. ; 
i- - ' . r 
,"," ,' ',-,~. u 
r',. 
4. For the convenience of the court, this affidavit is 
organized into six parts. Part I submits for your consideration my 
qualifications as an expert witness. Part II explains my approach 
to the issues raised by this case. Part III reviews admissibility 
principles governing expert testimony. Part IV considers the 
exclusion of expert testimony on foreseeability. Part V discusses 
the exclusion of expert testimony on the so-called "moth 
phenomenom." Finall y, Part VI addresses ... ;hether sanctions are 
warranted in this case. 
I 
General Qualifications 
5. I have taught evidence at B.Y.D. since 1985. Before 
then, I taught evidence at Vanderbilt Law School in Nashville, 
Tennessee. 
6 . In 1984, I co-authored with Irving Younger a case-
book entitled Principles of Evidence. The book has been adopted by 
numerous professors at other schools, and will soon be published in 
its second edition. 
7. I have lectured on evidence law to students and 
practitioners throughout the country. 
8. Because evidence law interfaces with civil litiga-
tion generally, I am also familiar .'ith Rule 11 principles. 
Indeed, I have published on this subject, and called for more 
aggressive application of sanctions to curtail abusive litigation. 
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See Goldsmith & Keith , ci vi 1 RICO Abuse: The .2>. 1 1 eaations in 
Context, 1986 B. Y. U. L . Rev . 55 , 92-97 (19 86 ) ; Go l dsmith , c i v i l 
RICO Reform: The Ba sis For Compromise, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 827 , 881 - 82 
(1987). within the context of the general debate over civil RICO 
reform, I have also testified about this subject before the United 
States Congress. RICO Ref orm, Hearings before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House of Representa-
tives, 99th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. Part 2, Serial 140, at 1261 
(1986) . 
9. My curriculum vita is attached as exhibit 1. 
II 
Analvtical Approach 
1 0 . I have reviewed the following materials in connec-
tion with this case: a ) all appellate briefs submitted by counsel 
through conclusion of the appellate process; b) Professor Hanna's 
affidavit; c) the mot i on for sanctions and accompanying memorandum ; 
d ) pert i nent portions of the record; e) the opinion rendered by the 
Court of Appeals; and f ) the aff idavi ts submitted by Dean Sam 
Thurmond and Dean Carl Hawkins. 
11. Given the numerous evidentiary issues raised on 
appeal , I have confined my analysis to those matters deemed most 
critical to the outcome of the case. Therefore, I did not consider 
every evidentiary point of conflict. 
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12. Furthermore, although obj ecti vely reasonable grounds 
support numerous issues raised in the petition for reconsideration, 
Mr. DeBry has requested that I confine my analysis to those 
evidentiary issues that clearly resulted in error by the Court of 
Appeals. 
13. Before presenting this analysis, I wish to state 
that my remarks reflect neither disrespect for the Court nor an 
intent to embarrass any of its members . ' If anything, I find the 
motion for sanctions, filed more than a year after conclusion of 
the case, exceedingly peculiar. The thrust of the motion 
apparently seeks to protect this Court from criticism. The Utah 
Court of Appeals, however , is a well respected institution, and 
hardly needs motions of this kind to protect its reputation. 
14. Furthermore, I undertook my analysis with the belief 
that outstanding jurists both welcome constructive criticism and, 
not infrequently, take action to rectify previous mistakes. 
Justice Jackson , for example, once observed: 
But if I have agreed to any prior decision which 
forecloses what now seems to be a sensible construction 
of this Act, I must frankly admit that I was unaware of 
it . Under these circumstances, except for any 
personal humiliation involved in admitting that I do not 
always understand the opinions of this Court, I see no 
'Mr. Debry also assures me that he will file a motion to seal 
the affidavits submitted by the experts supporting his position. 
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reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I 
was unconsciously wrong yesterday.' 
15 . Keeping ,,' ithin the spirit of Justice Jackson ' s 
remarks, I believe that the published opinion committed serious 
error in at least two critical respects: a ) the exclusion of eA~ert 
testimony concerning the foreseeability of collisions in the 
emergency lane; and b) the exclusion of expert testimony concerning 
the so-called "moth phenomenon. " To appreciate the basis for my 
conclusion, the evidentiary principles governing expert testimony 
must be briefly reviewed. 
III 
Admissibilitv Princioles Governina Expert Testimonv 
16. The Rules of Evidence modify common law doctrine by 
liberalizing the admissibility of expert testimony . Before the 
enactment of Rule 702 , "courts frequently asserted that there was 
no need for expert testimony unless the issue to which the 
2Massachuse~ts v. united states, 
(Jackson, J.) . On another occasion, 
333 U.S . 611, 639-~0 (19~8) 
Justice Jackson stated: 
Precedent , however , is not lacking for ways by which 
a judge may recede from a prior opinion that has proven 
un~enable . But an escape less self-depreciating 
was taken by Lord Westbury, who , it is said rebuffed a 
barrister ' s reliance upon an earlier opinion of his 
Lordship: "I can only say that I am amazed that a man of 
my intelligence s hould have been guilty of giving such an 
opinion." If there are other ways of gracefully and good 
naturedly surrendering former views to a better 
considered position, I invoke them all. 
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162, 17 7-78 (1950) (Jackson , J. ,). 
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testimony would be directed is 'not within the common knowledge of 
the average layrr,an. '" 3 Weinstein's Evidence sec. 702[02], at 702-
9 (1990). This standard no longer governs. As Weinstein observes: 
Must a court exclude expert testimony if the subject 
is within the comprehension of the average juror? Such 
a test is incompatible with the standard of helpfulness 
expressed in Rule 702. Firs~, it assumes wrongly that 
there is a bright line separating issues ;"ithin the 
comprehension of jurors from those that are not. 
Secondly, even ;.'hen jurors are well equipped to make 
judgrnen-.:s on -.:he basis of their common kno;.' ledge and 
exper ience, experts may have specia lized knowledge to 
bring to bear on the same issue which would be helpful. 
Id. at 702-15 (emphasis added) see D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 3 
Federal Evidence sec. 380, at 633 ( 1979 ) 
17. Given this liberalized standard, "doubts about 
whether an exper-.:'s testimony will be useful should generally be 
resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors 
such as time or surprise favoring exclusion." 3 weinstein 1 s 
Evidence sec. 702 [02J, at 702-30. This approach is warranted 
because " [t Jhe jury is intelligent enough, aided by counsel, to 
ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations." Id. 
18. The -:.rial judge I s ruling, however, ordina:.-ily i s 
reviewed under an "abuse of discre1:ion l1 standard, and is rarely 
disturbed on appeal. Id. at 702 -22 & 26. The abuse of discre~ion 
standard, however, does not apply if the trial court "rests its 
decision on a misstatement of law. 11 Roe v . Deere and Co. I 855 F.2d 
151, 155 (3rd Cir. 1988). Under such circumstances, the ruling must 
be examined for "legal error." Id. 
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19. Based on these principles, I believe that the trial 
judge clearly abused his discretion in declining to admit expert 
testimony concerning the foreseeability of a collision in the 
emergency lane. In addition, the trial judge's decision excluding 
expert testimony on the "moth phenomenon" was both an abuse of 
discretion and based on an incorrect legal standard. These rulings 
are discussed separately below. 
IV 
The Exclusion of Expert Testimonv on Foreseeabilitv 
20. To establish proximate cause and foreseeability, 
Appellant sought to introduce expert testimony concerning the 
following factors: a) the purpose of the emergency lane; b) the 
fact that road designers recognize that vehicles will sometimes 
drive into the emergency lane; c) that emergency lanes are designed 
to provide a recovery zone for errant vehicles; and d) that truck 
drivers are trained to know that errant vehicles may drive into an 
emergency lane , and, thus, are instructed not to park in such 
lanes. 
21. The trial court rejected this evidence because it 
would not be "helpful " to the jury . Transcript, at 245, 254,& 293. 
22 . In my judgment, the excluded evidence would have 
been very helpful to the jury. For example, most people probably 
assume that emergency lanes are intended to provide an area to make 
emergency repairs or to leave a car temporarily pending repairs. 
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Few of us know that such lanes are also designed to provide a 
recovery zone for errant vehicles , much less that truckers receive 
specific training on the need to keep such lanes open. Expert 
testimony ordinarily would be necessary to make this point. 
Indeed, I believe that such testimony would have been admissible 
under the more stringent pre-Rules " necessity " standard applied by 
many courts. 
23. The Court of Appeals, however, never addressed the 
issue of helpfulness . The opinion states that some of this 
evidence pertained only to the question of negligence. As the 
trial judge had dire cted a verdict on the negligence issue, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that such evidence was properly rejected 
as irrelevant. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
24 . As to the evidence bearing on foreseeability , the 
Court of Appeals merely noted that the trial judge had rejected 
this testimony because it "would not be particularly helpful to the 
jury. The [trial] court believed that the jury was as capable as 
the expert to make the determination of foreseeability. " Id. 
Rather than review this issue , however , the Court of Appeals 
rejected the appeal because "plaintiff has failed to carry his 
burden of shol.'ing that the claimed error was substantial and 
prejudicial. " Id. 
25. By taking this approach , the Court of Appeals made 
two fundamental mistakes. First, the Court failed to recognize 
8 
---, 
that all of this evidence pertained to foreseeability . The fact 
that such evidence also bore upon negligence did not preclude its 
relevance to foreseeability, which constitutes a separate element 
of a tort claim. See, e.a., Sheehan v. citv of New York , 354 
N.E.2d 832 , 834 (N.Y. 1976) ("negligence and proximate cause 
frequently overlap in the proof and theory which support each of 
them"); cf . united States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) 
("proof used to establish 
cases coalesce " ) . 
. separate elements may in particular 
26 . Second, the Court failed to recognize that excluding 
this evidence was inherently prejudicial because it prevented 
appellant from presenting the only available evidence on a critical 
element of its case. " [W]hen the erroneously excluded evidence 
would have been the only or primary evidence in support of . a 
claim 
Weinstein ' s 
the error is generally 
Evidence sec. 103[06], at 
found prejudicial." 1 
103-70 (1990) (citing 
extensive authority). See also Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 
722 F.2d 1134, 1140 (3d Cir. 1983) (expert testimony "crucial; " 
" [w] i thout it, plaintiffs could not establish causation. " ) ; Shad v. 
Dean .htter Revnolds, Inc. , 799 F.2d 525 , 530 (9th Cir . 1986) 
(exclusion 
"prevented 
of expert testimony prejudicial, as plaintiffs 
from presenting their case to a jury") ; Linkstrom 
v. Golden T. Farms, 883 F.2d 269 , 271-272 (3d Cir. 1989) (exclusion 
of expert testimony on causation deemed prejUdicial). 
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27. Under such circumstances, there is a "reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings . " 
Slusher v . Ospital bv ospital, 777 P . 2d 43 7 ,444 (Utah 1989) 
(setting forth the general standard).3 Indeed, it makes no sense 
to reject evidence as unhelpful to the jury and then to deem the 
exclusion non-prejudicial when the jury returns a verdict directly 
at odds with the proffered evidence. 
v 
The Exclusion of Expert Testimonv on the Moth Phenomenon 
28. Appellant sought to introduce evidence of the so-
called "moth phenomenon" to explain how a drowsy driver could have 
been lured by flashing taillights to crash into appellees' truck. 
Appellant ' s Substitute B~ief, at 2-3 . The trial rejected this 
3Significantly, the "reasonable likel i hood " standard does not 
require proof of a probability. State v. Kniaht , 734 P.2d 913, 920 
(Utah 19 87 ) ( " [T ) hought f ul reflection sugges~s that confidence in 
the outcome may be undermined at some point SUbstantially sho~t of 
the 'more probable than not ' portion of the spectrum " ) . 
In the present case, the significance of the error was 
compounded by the following improper statement, made by defense 
counsel , du ring closing argument: 
[T ) he foreseeability ques~ion is: How was Stan wneeler 
expected to foresee that at that precise time if, as Yu. 
Debry said, one in a billon chances that it would happen 
right at that particular time--
117 Utah Adv. Rep. , at 17 . The Court of Appeals did not view this 
remark as prejudicial, within the total context , because of the 
trial judge's neutral admonishment to the jury. rd. The excluded 
expert testimony, howev er, would have explained to the jury why 
such accidents are foreseeable generally and why truckers , in 
particular, know to expect them. 
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evidence as unhelpful, lacking factua l foundation , and prejudicial . 
117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. 
29. The Court of Appeals did not address separately the 
question of helpfulness under Rule 702. Instead, the opinion 
implies that the trial judge merged this issue into his analysis of 
foundation and prejudice. Id. According to the opinion, the trial 
judge reasoned that absent foundation, such testimony would be 
unhelpful and prejudicial. Id. The Court of ».ppeals then 
sustained the trial judge ' s ruling simply by finding no abuse of 
discretion under Rule 403 . Id. 
30. The tr ial court, however, did not merge his analysis 
of helpfulness and foundation. Transcript, at 245, 254, & 293. 
Therefore , the Court of Appeals should have treated these issues 
separately. 1'.S few jurors would be familiar ;"ith the "moth 
phenomenon, " such expert testimony would obviously help explain why 
an awake drive would drive straight into the rear-end of a truck 
that is flashing its taillights. Indeed, this testimony also would 
have qualified under the pre-Rules " necessity " standard governing 
expert proof. Thus, the trial court's rejection 0: this proof as 
unhelpful constitutes an abuse of discretion . 
31. The Court of Appeals ' analysis of the factual 
foundation supporting this testimony is also problematic. The 
Court stated: 
[T]he theory is premised on the fact that a driver must 
be awake in order to be so " lured." Plaintiff ' s own 
11 
expert admitted that there was no conclusive way to 
determine Stephen Ostler ' s state of consciousness prior 
to the accident. Nor does the theory necessarily 
establish causation because plaintiff ' s expert conceded 
there was no evidence of the factors triggering the moth 
phenomenon. 
Id . (emphasis added). 
32. This analysis commits two mistakes . First, plain-
tiff was not required to establish steven Ostler 's state of 
consciousness "conc lusive[ly] ." As the relevance of the proffered 
testimony was conditional upon proof of Ostler's consciousness, the 
trial judge's preliminary factual determination was governed by 
Rule l04(b). Under that provision , a proponent need only establish 
a prima facie case with respect to the underlying fact at issue 
(e.g. Ostler's state of consciousness). Rule l04(b) is designed to 
protect against judges removing a matter from the jury ' s domain 
whenever the court is not personally persuaded of the existence of 
12 
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certain facts . ' In the present case , however, that is precisely 
what occurred. 
33. Furthermore , the Court of Appeals mistakenly emphasized the 
apparent concession by appellant ' s expert . I n so doing , the Court 
overlooked the fact that appellant cited other portions of the 
expert ' s testimony supporting application of the moth phenomenon to 
this case. J'.DDellan t ' s substitute Brief, at 4- 5. In addition, 
another expert also testified that the foundational factors 
'Of course, courts routinely preclude evidence from jury 
consideration when making competency determinations under Rule 
104(a). Thus , for example, witness competency i s governed by Rule 
104 (a). But the question of ,,'itness competency remains distinct 
from the relevance of his testimony, which is determined by Rule 
104 (b) . 
Though courts rarely mention Rule 104(b) in resolving factual 
questions involving expert testimony , the approach outlined above 
best r eflects the theory underlying Rule 702: weaknesses in an 
expert ' s position are to be developed on cross - examination. Cf. 
Coleman v. De Minico, 730 F.2d 42, 45 - 47 (1st cir. 1984 ) 
( sus~aining admissibility of expert testimony based on incomplete 
factual record and noting that facts at issue " do not lend 
themselves to precise quantificat ion" ); Sinaer v . E . I du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 579 F . 2d 433, (8 th Cir . 1978) (court rejected attack 
on expi2:-t testimony as speculative; this "attack must be viewed in 
light of the new Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert 
testimony. While an opinion still 'rises no higher than the 
level of evidence and the logic upon which it is predicated , I it is 
now for the jury, with the assistance of vigorous cross-
examination, to measure the \,,'ort:h of the opinion " ) i Hurst v. United 
States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1989) ( "A trial court should 
exclude expert testimony only if it is so fundamentally unsupported 
tha~ it cannot help the factf inder " ) ; Snvder v. ..'hi ttaker CorD. , 
839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1988) ( " that these f a cts [supporting 
expert testimony) were thin" could be attacked on cross-
examination); United States v. 478.34 Acres of Land, 578 F.2d 156 , 
15S - 160 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying Rule 104(b) to expert testimony) . 
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supporting this theory were present. Transcript, at 278 -281. In 
my judgment, the moth phenomenon is supported by prima facie 
evidence. 
34 . Although the Court of Appeals may not have been made 
fully aware of the complete factual record, 5 the commission of 
error is further indicated by the Court's affirmance of the trial 
judge not"' ithstanding appellees having opened the door to such 
proof by their own trial tactics. 
35 . After rejecting appellant's evidence on the moth 
phenomenon, the trial judge allowed defendant-appellees to 
introduce extensive proof concerning the ability of an awake driver 
to stop before hitting a truck parked in the emergency lane. 
Aooellant's Substitute Brief , at 19-20; ADpellant ' s ReDlv Brief, at 
10-12. As this evidence necessarilv assumed an awake driver, the 
trial court should have permitted plaintiff to introduce the "moth 
phenomenon" in rebuttal. Failure to do so gave the jury only one 
side of the picture. Thus , prejudicial error occurred. Cf . 
Breidor v . Sea:::-s, Roebuck & Co. , 722 F.2d 1134, 1140-4 1 (3rd Cir. 
1983) (in reve:::-sing fo:::- failure to admit expert testimony, Court 
characterized evidence as "crucial" because of the need to rebut 
5Appellant 's briefs summarized the evidence supporting Ostler's 
awakeness, but did not specify that two experts testified to the 
adequacy of the factual foundation. The appellate opinion, 
however, recognizes that testimony from two experts was excluded. 
117 Utah Adv. Rep., at 15. In addition, appellant 's references to 
the record included pages containing "moth phenomenon" testimony 
from both experts. Apoellant ' s substitute Brief, at 3-5. 
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opponent ' s proof); MurDhv v. Maanolia Electric Power Association , 
639 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1981) ( " exclusion of [rebuttal ) 
evidence struck at the heart of appellants ' case " ); Fox v. 
Dannenbera , 906 F.2d 1253 , 1257 (8th Cir. 1990) (exclusion 0: 
expert testimony constitutes reversible error I II especially . in 
light of the district court I s subsequent admission " of e>:pert 
evidence to the contrary) . See aenerallv McCormick on Evidence 
1~7-1~8 (198~). The Court of Appeals opinion , however, never even 
addresses this issue. 
VI 
The sanctions Issue 
36. Given the preceding analysis , I do not believe that 
sanctions are warranted in this case . Objectively reasonable 
grounds supported Mr. DeBry ' s decision to ask the Court of Appeals 
to reconsider its rUling. 
37 . Admittedly, Mr. DeBry chose an unorthodox method to 
petition the Court for reconsideration. However, given the failure 
of his initial appeal, he obviously felt the need to do something 
that would get the Court 1 s at~ention. The Hanna affidavit achieved 
t.hat function. In addition, as a motion for rehearing ordinarily 
does not afford counsel the opportunity to address numerous issues , 
the Hanna affidavit gave Mr. DeEry a vehicle for presenting a wide 
var iety of evidentiary lssues. These issues, in my judgment, '.'ere 
not frivolous. 
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38. Moreover, I agree with the views expressed by Dean 
Thurmond in his affidavit. Gi ven both the ser iousness of the 
issues at hand and the extent of injuries incurred by his client, 
it was not unprofessional for Mr. DeBry to take the extreme measure 
of filing an extra-record affidavit. Rule 11 and its various 
counterparts were not intended to chill creative advocacy. 
39. For more than a decade, I have stressed to my 
students the need to become "can do" lalo.'Yers. Too many attorneys 
approach the law in a Io.'ooden and mechanical manner. The quality of 
legal representation -- and ultimately the quality of justice 
suffer as a result. See A. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedv and ~is 
Times 2~3 (1978) (recounting an incident in which Kennedy 
criticized the "can't do" lawyers on his staff) 
~ o . Whether the Court agrees with hi s ~ ~. l..aCL...1CS, Mr. 
DeBry ' s submission of the Hanna affidavit is an effort at "can do" 
lalo.'Yering . Unorthodox methods do not allo.'ays succeed but, so long 
as they are supported by objectively reasonable grounds, sanctions 
should not be imposed for such advocacy . 
_ ~L.. 
DATED this ~ day of July, 1991. 
~)/l/'L( I!lLc~IC';+( 
By: { (, 
MICHP.EL GOLDSMITH 
i 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Salt Lake city, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
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Mary T Ncon!\n 
C!C;}; oi mil Coun 
l.'tEll COv.i oi App~ls 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RALPH OSTLER, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
ALBINA TRANSFER CO., INC. 
F & R ROE, INC., and 
STANLEY E. WHEELER, 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) MOTION TO RECALL THE MANDATE 
) AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION; 
) AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No: 880228-CA 
) 
) 
--------------------------)--------------------------
Appellant, Ralph Ostler, respectfully moves this court to 
recall the mandate and to correct its prior opinion in this case 
(781 P.2d 445). 
Appellant further moves to consolidate this motion with 
the Petition for Sanctions Against Robert J. DeBrv in his capacity 
as Counsel for Plaintiff Ra l ph Ostler (case No. 910246-CA) filed on 
May 3, 1991-
DATED this 02/ day of June, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorn
a
y f Appellant 
I ~ 0 // 
By: Overt c=l /?'57~ 
ROBERT J. (S.EBRY 
~. 
/ 
( 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO RECALL THE K~~DATE AND TO CORRECT THE OPINION 
AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE (Ostler v. Albina, et al.) was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this ~I day of June, 1991, to the following : 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, UT 84603 
0566-157\jn 
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lJIsJt CoU!'\ of AppM!s 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Albina Transfer Co . , Inc. I ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
F <. R Roe, Inc. , and Stanley E. ) (Not For Publication) 
Wheeler, ) 
) 
Petitioners, ) Case No. 910246-CA 
) 
v. ) 
) F I L E D 
Robert J. DeBry, In His ) (August 5, 1991 ) 
Capacity as Counsel for Ralph ) 
Ostler, ) 
) 
Respondents . ) 
Origi n al Proceeding in th is Court 
Attorneys: M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Petitioners 
Robert J. DeBry, Sa l t Lake City, fo r Respondents 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Ru sson (Law and Motion) . 
Petitioners 1 filed a petition in this court seeking 
sanctions against Robert J. DeBry in his capacity as counsel 
fo r Ralph Ostler in an earlier appea l. That appeal culminated 
in the opinion r e po r ted at 781 P . 2d 445 ( Utah App . 1989 ) , ~. 
denied, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah 1990). Respondent Robert 
J. DeBry filed a response to the pet iti on and the following 
motions: 
1 . Mot ion To Recall The Mandate and To 
Correct The Opinion; a nd Motion To 
Consol ida te 
2 . Moti o n To Seal The Record 
1. Petitioners uS'2d the '.:a pti')11 Cl.'.'''' th'2 ':'r ioinal a ppeal. 
f il ed by Ralph Os tl '2r, as the 'capti.')" fnr 1:.!Jeir pleadings. 
That appeal was culminated over a year befo re the present 
petitio n was filed. The petition is, accordingly, considered 
as an or iginal proceeding filed in this court and the caption 
has been adjusted to reflect th a t fact. 
3 . Motion To File Supplemental Affidavit In 
Support of Memorandum In Opposition To 
Petition For Sanctions Against Robert J. 
DeBry As Counsel For Plaintiff Ralph 
Ostler 
This court's initial inquiry must be whether there is a 
basis for jurisdiction to determine the petition for 
sanctions. The appellate process, including action on the 
petition for writ o f certiorari, has been concluded for over a 
year. Accordingly, we consider the petition as an original 
proceeding in this court. The petition does not contain a 
jurisdictional statement and purportedly relies upon Rule 33 of 
t he utah Rules o f Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules o f Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78 - 27-56 (1991 
Supp.) as the basis for the claim. While those provisions 
pertain tO , the substanti ve claim, they do not state a basis for 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78 - 2a - 3(1990) describes this court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. Subsection (1) describes this 
court ' s original, as opposed to appellate, jurisdict i on. 2 The 
petitioners have not cited any provis i on of section 78 - 2a - 3(1) 
as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the petition 
for sanctions. Similarly, they have not confo r med their 
petition to the pleading requirements of Utah R. App . P. 19 
pertaining to petitions for extraordinary writs, nor do they 
characterize the petition as being filed under that rule. 
The request for sanctions should have been made while 
the appeal was pending. 3 Petitioners argue, however, that the 
acts complained of occurred after this court's opinion issued, 
in connection with the petition for rehearing and petition for 
2 . Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a - 3(1) provides: "The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all writs and process 
necessary: (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and 
decrees; o r (b) in aid of its jurisdiction. " 
3. The procedure for seeking sanctions on appeal was clarified 
in amendments to Utah R. App. P. 33, and Utah R . App. P. 40 
that became effective in April of 1990. Ru le 33(c)(1) 
provides, in part, " p.., pClrty 111::'l -~- I · r:~l~lle.st f.1;:1nl;'~l ~s l1nder t his rule 
only as part o f tile 8[.lpellee· S 1fI,_,ti'_" , (<:' t 3ullllllary dispcsi tion 
under Rule 10, as part of the "ppellee's brief, or as part of a 
party ' s response to a motion or ot her paper. " Rule 40 
incorporates the procedures of Rule 33 by reference. 
910246-CA 2 
writ of ce rti orar i. This court did not call for a response to 
the petition for rehearing. Peti t ioners, however, filed 
respo nses to the petition for writ of certiorari on January 15 
and January 25, 1990. Neither response included a request for 
sanctions. Petitioners filed a motion to strike the Hanna 
affidavit in February, 1990, and again did not request 
sa nct i ons, although they were successfu l i n obtaining a ruling 
by the Utah Supreme Court striking the affidavit. A petition 
for s ancti o ns was filed in the trial court ten months after the 
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari. The claim for 
sanctions was ripe. at the very least, dur i ng pro ceedings in 
the Utah Supreme Court . Issuance of the remittitur ended this 
court's jurisdiction to consider the claim for sanctions on 
appeal . 
We dismiss the petition for sanctions for lack of 
jurisdiction . On the same basis. we deny the motions to recall 
mandate. to consolidate the present petition with the o riginal 
appeal . and t o supplement the response to the petition . We 
further deny the motion to seal the records of this court in 
the o riginal appeal and in the proceedi ng s on this petition . 
A(:t~~R : ~m. 
Judit 8i lings. , 
Ass c i ate P _S~JUd 
R nal . Garff. Judge II ' 
ef ~/,. 
'$. -~/..4C4J » 
Leonard H. Russ on. Judge 
910246-CA 3 
COVER SHEET 
CASE TITLE : 
Albina Transfer Company, Inc.; 
F & R Roe, Inc . ; and Stanley E. 
\-Iheeler , 
Petitioners, 
v 
Robert J. DeBry , in His Capacity 
as Counsel for Ralph Ostler, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 910246 - CA 
August 5, 1991. MEMOP~NDUM DECISION (Not For PUblication) . 
opinion of the Court by PER CURIAM. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of August, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing 11EMORll.NDUM DECISION ,·Ias 
deposited in the United Sta tes mail to each of the parties 
listed below: 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
Attorneys at Law 
90 Nort h 100 East 
P . O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
Robert J. DeBry 
Attorneys at Law 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Deputy 
. I J J/ I '1. 
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APPENDIX 12 
Art. VIII , § 2 CONSTITUTIO:\ OF L"TAH 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of su preme court.] 
The supreme court shall have o,iginal jurisdicLion 
to issue all extraordinary ''''Tits and to answer ques-
tions of SLaLe law certified by a coun of the United 
States. The supreme court shall have appellate juris· 
diction over all other matters to be exercised as pro-
vided by statute. and power to issue all writs and 
orders necessary for the exe:-cise of the supremE' 
coun's jurisdiction or Lhe compl~L~ determination of 
any cause. 1985 
APPENDIX 13 
78·2--4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1 ) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce· 
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two· thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con· 
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justi ces and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perfonn any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and di scipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. 1986 
APPENDIX 14 
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1 
R ule 46. Consideration s governing review of certiorari. 
Re\"iew by a wrjt of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted onl Y for special and important reasons . The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion. indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a ) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decisior. of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the 
Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjuclicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Coun's power of supervision; or 
(dl When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal , state , or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by the Supreme Court. 
